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iABSTRACT
THE UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA: A CASE STUDY IN
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Yıldız Tuğba Kurtuluş
M.A., Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Prof. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu
October 2001
In 1994 Rwandan genocide approximately 1 million people were killed in
three months. This genocide took place in the presence of the United Nations forces
deployed there. In spite of the signals of the coming genocide, international
community could not do much to prevent or stop this genocide. Therefore it was a
“failure”. This study aims to identify the principal political and strategic constraints
explaining the failure of the UN and international community as a whole to address
the genocide in Rwanda. It examines the events that led to UN intervention and
describes UN action. It also aims at determining the position of Rwanda case in the
evolution of the doctrine and practice of humanitarian intervention. This study asks
questions like “How can we define the UN intervention in Rwanda?”, “How does the
Rwanda case reveal the difficulties the UN face with, in terms of humanitarian
intervention?”, “What are the reasons for this failure?” and “What lessons should be
taken from the experience?”. It concludes that in the absence of a general doctrine
guiding humanitarian intervention, and a solid mechanism capable of taking action
when necessary, the decision on whether or not to intervene will be caught up in
politics. Rwanda experience suggests that intervention is most likely where perceived
national and ethical interests converge, less so when they conflict.
Keywords: The United Nations, Rwanda, Genocide, Humanitarian Intervention,
Peace Operations.
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ÖZET
BİRLEŞMİŞ MİLLETLER VE RUANDA: İNSANİ MÜDAHALE
KONUSUNDA BİR ÖRNEK OLAY
Yıldız Tuğba Kurtuluş
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
                                 Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu
Ekim 2001
1994 Ruanda soykırımında üç ay içinde bir milyona yakın insan öldürüldü.
Bu soykırım Ruanda’da konuşlandırılmış Birleşmiş Milletler güçlerinin gözü önünde
gerçekleşti. Yaklaşan soykırıma işaret eden gelişmelere rağmen uluslararası toplum
soykırımı önleyemedi ve durduramadı. Dolayısıyla Ruanda’da verilen cevap bir
“başarısızlıktı”. Bu çalışma Birleşmiş Milletler’in ve genel olarak uluslararası
toplumun Ruanda’daki insani krize cevap vermedeki başarısızlığını açıklayan temel
politik ve stratejik sınırlamaları tanımlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Birleşmiş Milletler
müdahalesini gerektiren gelişmeleri inceleyen ve bu müdahaleyi tanımlayan çalışma,
aynı zamanda Ruanda örneğinin, insani müdahalenin doktrinde ve pratikteki gelişimi
içindeki yerini belirlemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma, “Birleşmiş Milletler’in
Ruanda’daki müdahalesi nasıl tanımlanabilir?”, “Ruanda örneği Birleşmiş
Milletler’in insani müdahale konusunda karşılaştığı zorlukları nasıl ortaya
koymaktadır?”, “Bu başarısızlığın nedenleri nelerdir?”, “Ruanda deneyiminden
alınması gereken dersler nelerdir?” gibi sorular sormaktadır. Çalışma, insani
müdahale konusunda yol gösterici genel bir doktrin ve gerektiğinde müdahale
edebilecek sağlam bir mekanizma olmadığı sürece, müdahale edip etmeme
konusunda verilen kararların politika tarafından belirleneceği sonucuna varmaktadır.
Ruanda deneyimi algılanan ulusal çıkarlarla etik çıkarların uyuştuğu durumlarda
müdahale olasılığının arttığına, bu çıkarların çatışması halindeyse müdahale
ihtimalinin zayıfladığına işaret etmektedir.
Anahtar Sözcükler: Birleşmiş Milletler, Ruanda, Soykırım (Jenosit), İnsani
Müdahale, Barış Operasyonları.
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1INTRODUCTION
On 6 April 1994, President Habyarimana of Rwanda was assassinated, and in
the following three months, up to one million Rwandans were butchered. The UN
withdrew its peacekeeping force in April, and then redeployed it three months later,
creating a gap in the peacekeeping presence, which corresponded to the worst of the
killings. After this failure, international community undertook an outstanding relief
operation, which cost roughly thirty times what was spent on the peacekeepers, who
could have saved tens, perhaps hundreds, of thousands of lives, if they had been
reinforced.1
The genocide in Rwanda was one of the greatest tragedies since the Second
World War. The horrible events brought new urgency to the ongoing debate over
“UN humanitarian intervention”, the role of the UN in multilateral peacekeeping,
peace enforcement and post-conflict peace building. This study is a systematic-
descriptive analysis of the UN intervention in Rwanda. It examines the events that
led to UN intervention and describes the UN action. The purpose of the study is to
identify the principal political and strategic constraints explaining the “failure” of the
United Nations and the great powers to address the genocide in Rwanda.
Humanitarian intervention has become a popular issue in the realm of IR
discipline, especially in the post-Cold War era. The removal of East-West tensions
coincided with the beginning of a period of growing intrastate violence. Thus,
                                                          
1 Bruce D. Jones, “Intervention without Borders: Humanitarian Intervention in Rwanda 1990-1994”,
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1995, p. 225.
2evolution of “humanitarian intervention” entered into a new phase. Media has made
people more aware of situations that seem to require intervention. Globalization has
made the impact of the crises felt everywhere. As a result of these developments and
political pressures from various constituencies, such as activist political groups,
human rights organizations and citizens, states often feel compelled to intervene in
domestic conflicts, even when their direct stakes are limited. The sanctity once
accorded to state boundaries has eroded considerably, and the norms governing
humanitarian intervention have evolved under the pressure of the new circumstances.
The changes particular to the post-Cold War world, however, have created
intense conflicts that complicate prospects of use of force. This contradiction gave
birth to difficulties called “intervention dilemma”; a dilemma between political
pressures for action- action to end the slaughter, to feed the refugees, to restore
democracy, and to save lives- versus the natural reluctance of populations to pay the
price of such interventions. Pressure in many democratic states against the use of
public funds for foreign operations and, the use of military power, putting their
soldiers’ lives at risk has made intervention a risky business for politicians.
The situation is the same for the United Nations by which international
community carries out interventions multilaterally. The number of civil wars and
other kinds of internal conflicts have increased tremendously, and the range of
conflicts has exceeded the UN’s capacity to address them. There have been
accusations of bias in the choice of which conflicts the UN intervenes in. As a result
of these problems in UN operations, the organization adopted a “cautious” policy,
which made it difficult to enforce solutions. Rwanda was a clear demonstration of
this dilemma.
3Rwanda can be considered as a turning point in the evolution of
“humanitarian intervention”. The pendulum that swung towards humanitarian
intervention in the first half of the 1990s has since then been moving in the opposite
direction; such action has been in decline since a peak around 1993, after the Somalia
debacle. Rwanda was the first humanitarian emergency to be affected from this
change. It is important to examine the Rwanda case, because it represents a real test
of the international community’s ability to implement the concept of humanitarian
intervention.
First, the Rwanda case is important for it displays very well the “intervention
dilemma”, together with other difficulties of humanitarian intervention. Today, the
dilemma is not between sovereignty, prohibition of use of force (principle of non-
intervention) and intervention for humanitarian purposes. As mentioned above, the
dilemma posed by humanitarian intervention is between moral imperatives and
practical concerns, namely the prospect of significant financial costs, loss of life and
military difficulties. Because of this dilemma states remain reluctant to intervene
militarily, as they did in Rwanda. Unprecedented levels of humanitarian aid to the
camps by international community stood in stark contrast to international passivity in
the face of genocide only weeks before. Undertaking military operations was more
risky than providing humanitarian aid.
For the United States, whose involvement is important for the success of any
humanitarian intervention operation, the dilemma is between “interventionist” and
“isolationist” foreign policy approaches. After the “Somalia Syndrome”, it is
commonly accepted that US should not be a “world policeman”, thus “the
commitment of the armed forces must be made only when it is clear that the benefits
4would outweigh any loss to American national interests”.2 In the Rwanda case,
interests outweighed benefits of intervention and US reluctance to intervene played a
role in the failure.
Second, “inaction” in Rwanda is a striking example. Because, while other
humanitarian crises bring up a discussion on sovereignty, principle of non-
intervention and criteria that justify humanitarian intervention, “genocide” in
Rwanda constituted not only a justification but also an obligation to intervene.
Genocide is the most clear-cut example of human rights abuses, which should justify
armed intervention. The 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, brings the obligation to prevent, suppress and punish the
crime of genocide, and legalizes UN intervention to stop genocide by giving member
states “the right to take action under the Charter as they consider appropriate for the
prevention and suppression of genocide”.
Third, in the history of peacekeeping operations UN Assistance Mission in
Rwanda (UNAMIR) is a showcase of dreadful superlatives.3 It was the first time a
peacekeeping force had found itself witnessing a genocide. Later UNAMIR also
witnessed what was probably the most sudden and largest mass movement of
distressed people in modern history. UNHCR reported that on 29 April 1994 250.000
Rwandan crossed into Tanzania over the previous 24 hours, marking the highest rate
of refugee exodus ever recorded in history.4 In its second incarnation, UNAMIR-II,
                                                          
2 Matthew S. Klimow, Moral vs. Practical: The Future of US Armed Intervention, Ontario, Canada:
Queen’s University Kingston, 1996, p. 2.
3 Nassrine Azimi (ed.), Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping Operations: Debriefing and Lessons,
Report and Recommendations of the International Conference Singapore, February 1997, The Hague,
London and Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1997, p. 163.
4 The UN, The Blue Helmets, A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, Third Edition, New York:
UN Department of Public Information, p. 347.
5the mission was the largest UN force ever deployed to a land-locked country, a fact
that complicated its deployment and operation.
Fourth, complex reasons for the failure is worth examining. The failure in
Rwanda has become a “hot potato”; some blamed the US for its reluctance to
intervene, and some blamed the United Nations for its “indifference” and
“incompetence”. What were the reasons for failure? Was it “lack of will”, “lack of
resources” or “limited mandate of the UNAMIR mission”? Do the reasons have
something in common with other failures?
Fifth, the Rwanda case is important for it points out the need for reform in the
UN. Lessons taken from Rwandan experience have a practical value. Although they
are unlikely ever to be fully realized because of the “politics of intervention”, they
propose steps to strengthen the capacity of the UN to create a more effective anti-
genocide regime.
Considering all these issues, this study attempts to determine the position of
Rwanda case in the evolution of the doctrine and practice of humanitarian
intervention and what it tells for the future humanitarian emergencies. Therefore, it is
necessary to establish a general framework of “humanitarian intervention” before
undertaking an examination of the Rwanda case.
The first chapter establishes the framework through an examination of the
evolution of the doctrine and practice of humanitarian intervention. It then proceeds
to an examination of different definitions of “humanitarian intervention” made by
outstanding authors. Having decided the definition to be adopted by this study,
Chapter I next analyzes arguments for and against humanitarian intervention.
“Arguments for and against” display dilemmas and problems of humanitarian
6intervention. These problems are selectivity (uneven response by international
community), the absence of a general doctrine, consensus building problems faced
by international community, UN dependency on its members’ willingness, reluctance
to intervene, lack of US leadership, difficulty in finding troop contributors,
coordination problems and financial problems.
Under the heading of “Legal Bases, Permissible Standards of, and Criteria for
Humanitarian Intervention” Chapter I explores what circumstances should give rise
to a right of forcible humanitarian intervention, and what are the legal bases and
limits of that intervention. And finally, under the heading of  “UN and Humanitarian
intervention”, it aims to clarify the systematic and operational problems threatening
successful implementation of intervention. In this part, Chapter I briefly discusses the
relationship between humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping. By asking
whether UN peacekeeping is a suitable means for undertaking humanitarian
intervention operations in “complex emergencies” like Rwanda, it tries to determine
whether deployment of a peacekeeping force, UNAMIR, was a wrong decision,
causing failure, or not.
Chapter II consists of two parts: “history of the ethnic conflict” and
“evolution of the crisis”. The purpose of the chapter is to present historical
developments in Rwanda that culminated in genocide beginning in 1994. History of
the ethnic conflict points to the essentially political and economic causes of this
“complex” humanitarian crisis, and describes the events that led to international
intervention. This chapter shows that violence has been part of a “winner-take-all”
mentality that has dominated Rwanda’s governments during the colonial and post-
7colonial periods.5 While “history of the ethnic conflict” points out a culture of
political impunity, “evolution of the crisis” illustrates the role of media in the
politicization of ethnic identities, and describes how the media can be used by ethnic
manipulators to stir up ethnic fears and hatreds among the population concerned.6
After the examination of the evolution of the crisis, Chapter III handles UN
involvement in Rwanda: UN operations UNOMUR, UNAMIR-I, UNAMIR-II,
French Operation Turquoise, US Operation Support Hope and other additional
support operations, Human Rights Field Operation (HRFOR) and International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The analysis of the operations covers the UN
Resolutions and other decisions, legal bases of the resolutions, mandates and rules of
engagement of the operations, composition, deployment, and financing of the forces,
and evaluation of their performance.
 Chapter IV applies the framework established in Chapter I (criteria that
justify humanitarian intervention, legal bases for intervention etc.) to the Rwanda
case. It makes a critical analysis of the international reaction and searches for why
moral and legal prohibitions against genocide do not match the political and strategic
incentives to end this practice. In the search, it asks questions like, “How can we
define the UN intervention in Rwanda?”, “How does Rwanda case reveal the
difficulties the UN face with, in terms of humanitarian intervention?”, “Could
UNAMIR be successful and stop the killing if better managed?”, “How can we
assess the success/failure of the operations in Rwanda?”, and “How can we explain
the “failure” of the international community in this case?” Chapter 4 also asks “what
                                                          
5 US Agency for International Development (USAID), Complex Humanitarian Emergencies and
USAID’s Humanitarian Response, USAID Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 27,
Center for Development Information and Evaluation, December 2000, p. 11.
8are the lessons taken from Rwandan experience?” and examines how to improve
international system to prevent genocide.
After the examination of the reasons for the failure, lessons and their
implications on future practice, Conclusion aims to make an overall assessment of all
these discussions and determine what Rwanda case tells about humanitarian
intervention today and in the future.
Here, it is important to emphasize that the scope of this study is limited with
the UN involvement only and the time period 1993-1996. NGOs and other non-state
actors, especially MSF (Médicines Sans Frontières) played an important part in the
crisis. To understand the importance of their role one need only to consider the scale
of their involvement. While negotiation efforts cost approximately US $ 3 million,
and the budget for UNAMIR was $ 54 million for six months, eight months worth of
humanitarian assistance cost slightly over $ 1 billion.7 But, this study deals only with
the UN involvement and asks “could it be successful in preventing genocide if better
managed in a timely manner?”
In this study, I have relied on official documents for first hand information,
and critical, non-official resources for a perceptive, informed account and objective
results. An official account is to be found in resources like, The United Nations and
Rwanda 1993-1996 (The UN Blue Book Series, Vol. X) covering UN documents,
resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council, statements by the
President of the Security Council, reports and letters of the Secretary General, reports
on human rights situation and humanitarian assistance, communications from
                                                                                                                                                                    
6 Dominique Jacquin-Berdal, “Ethnic Wars and International Intervention”, Millennium: Journal of
International Studies, 1998, Vol. 27, No. 1, p. 133.
7Bruce D. Jones, p. 245.
9Rwanda and other states members of the UN, communications from regional
organizations, cables sent by force commanders in Rwanda to the Secretary General;
The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peacekeeping, UN Secretariat’s account of the
UNAMIR mission, and “Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned From United
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) 1993-1996”. To ensure the
objectivity of these official account, I have also relied on reports by Independent
Inquiry, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Human Rights
Watch, Organization of African Unity (OAU), US Institute of Peace, books and
articles by outstanding as well as critical authors, internet and electronic journals.
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CHAPTER I
I. Humanitarian Intervention: A Conceptual Framework
Humanitarian intervention is “intervention inspired by humanitarian
considerations”.1 It has two components: “intervention” and “humanitarianism”.
Intervention is a violation of state’s sovereignty, and presupposes that the state in
question enjoys the right to autonomy. It’s humanitarian character is determined
according to some criteria. The main criteria is “humanitarian aim” (or humanitarian
cause); the aim of intervention should be effective redress for an unacceptable denial
or violation of fundamental human needs. Some writers argue that in order to be
labeled as “humanitarian intervention”, an act of intervention should serve purely to
humanitarian aims. Whereas, in the face of failures like Rwanda, other writers argue
that “humanitarian motives are important to prevent intervention from being abused
for states’ own interests, but it is better to do something, even in self interest than to
stand aside in hesitation and indifference.2 Humanitarian approach, humanitarian
means and humanitarian outcome are the other criteria used to determine the
“humanitarian” character of any intervention.3According to these criteria, the
intervention should be impartially conducted; the means employed should be
appropriate –necessary, sufficient and proportional– and the outcome of the
                                                          
1Bhikhu Parekh, “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention”, International Political Science Review, The
Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention, Vol. 18, No. 1, January 1997, p. 53.
2 Francis Kofi Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention, The
Hague, London and Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999, p. 198.
3 Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: A
Reconceptualization, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, pp. 225-226.
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intervention should be to the overall advantage of those in whose name it is carried
out.4
Intervention contradicts the concept of sovereignty, but when it is
“humanitarian” it is considered as an exception to the principle of non-intervention.
Regarding to its relation with “sovereignty”, humanitarian intervention can be
defined as “an act of intervention in the internal affairs of another country with a
view to ending the suffering caused by the disintegration or the gross misuse of the
authority of the state, and helping create conditions in which a viable structure of
civil authority can emerge”.5
 The doctrine and practice of “humanitarian intervention” have long been a
subject of controversy in international relations and international law. The main
reason for this controversy is the “intervention dilemma” which rests on competing
claims of state sovereignty and humanitarian assistance. Given that debates on
humanitarian intervention are embedded in the changing character of “state
sovereignty” it is necessary to examine the evolution of the concepts of
“sovereignty” and “humanitarian intervention”.6
I.a. Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian
Intervention
The concept of “sovereignty” was formulated by scholars such as Jean Bodin,
Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes in the 16th and 17th centuries. Bodin defined
                                                          
4 ibid.
5 Bhikhu Parekh, p. 55.
6 For a comprehensive coverage of the evolution of doctrine and practice, see Francis Kofi Abiew,
The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention, and Sean D. Murphy,
Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order, Procedural Aspects of
International Law Series, Vol. 21, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996, pp. 33-281.
12
sovereignty as “the most high, absolute and perpetual power over the citizens and
subjects in a commonwealth,…the greatest power to command”.7 For Hobbes
sovereignty was so absolute that there was no room for intervention.8 But, Grotius
had a different approach to sovereignty; he is often cited as providing the first
authoritative statement of the principle of humanitarian intervention. He pronounced
“the principle that exclusiveness of domestic jurisdiction stops when outrage upon
humanity begins”.9 Grotius’ 1625 De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Rights of War and
Peace) recognized “the use of force by one or more states to stop the maltreatment by
a state of its own nationals” as lawful when that conduct was so brutal and large
scale as to “shock the conscience of the community of nations”.10 That was the
beginning of the “competition” between sovereignty and intervention for
humanitarian purposes. In this “competition”, while some authors argue that
humanitarian intervention has coexisted with the development of state sovereignty,
others claim that intervention cannot be legal, justifiable or permissible even if it
were undertaken for humanitarian purposes.
The Peace of Westphalia (1648) marked the acceptance of the idea of
sovereign authority of state.11 The international system that evolved was based on the
idea that states were the main actors, and “sovereignty” was to be regarded as
absolute. However, the practice of religion could limit that absolute sovereignty; a
                                                          
7 Francis K. Abiew, pp. 26-27.
8 ibid.
9 Comfort Ero and Suzanne Long, “Humanitarian Intervention: A New Role for the United Nations?”,
International Peacekeeping, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 1995, p. 145.
10 H. Grotious, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, Vol. 2, New York: Oceana, 1964, pp. 38-39, quoted in Thomas
G. Weiss and Cindy Collins, Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention: World Politics and
Dilemmas of Help, Oxford: Westview Press, 1996, p. 17. According to Weiss, Chapter VII of the UN
Charter
reflects Grotius’ doctrine for humanitarian intervention.
11 Francis K. Abiew, p. 29.
13
sovereign who changed his religion could not compel his subjects to change theirs.12
In 1700s Kant, who is believed to have provided the theoretical basis for the League
of Nations, expanded on the notion of “global solidarity” by linking the idea of
national and international peace and security with the idea of promoting and
protecting individual human dignity.13
In the ensuing period, states “intervened” to protect the lives and property and
material interests of their nationals abroad.14 Military force was used to protect
mostly “fellow Christians” and “brother Slavs”.15 Then, as the “humanity deserving
of protection by military intervention became universalized”, military force was used
to protect “non-white” and “non-Christians”, for example, to suppress the slave
trade. Later, decolonization and the right of self-determination constituted strong
justifications for humanitarian intervention.16 But, these interventions were
undertaken by strong states unilaterally; there were no criteria on when and how to
intervene. Thus, intervention was open to abuse and strong states could use
“humanitarian” rhetoric to disguise their interests.
The League of Nations era was one of ambiguity in terms of humanitarian
intervention. On the one hand, “nothing in the language of the Covenant prohibited
humanitarian intervention”. 17 On the other hand, “nothing in the practice of states
during the inter-war period reveals a belief that the doctrine of humanitarian
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intervention was embodied in, or permitted by the Covenant”.18 Indeed, other than
requiring that a state undertake certain procedural steps to resolve a dispute before
resorting to war, the Covenant did nothing to outline when the use of force is or is
not permissible. The period reflected a sense that war was wrong and it should be
avoided entirely.19 Murphy argues,
 “During this era the brutal suppression of human rights in the Soviet Union,
Italy and Nazi Germany were unaddressed by the League and not considered as
a basis for intervention by other states. Japan’s invasion of Manchuria, Italy’s
invasion of Ethiopia and German occupation of Czechoslovakia, with a
“humanitarian rhetoric”, revealed how a doctrine of humanitarian intervention
might be severely abused”.20
The United Nations Charter does not have an article mentioning
“humanitarian intervention” either. But it brings some regulations and restrictions on
use of force and interference. Article 2(4) and Article 2(7) constitute the bases on
which arguments about humanitarian intervention take place.21 In this regard the
Charter is not without contradictions; it has mirrored the uneasy balance between the
cardinal principles of non-intervention and respect for human rights. Primarily an
organization whose main function was to maintain peace between states, the UN
included among its purposes stated in its Charter the promotion of values within
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them as respect for human rights. The second article guarantees territorial integrity
and the inviolability of national boundaries.
During the Cold War, interventions by superpowers occurred primarily in
their own spheres of influence and were driven largely by a concern that unfolding
events would inure to the benefit of the rival superpower.22 Interventions by other
states were driven occasionally by humanitarian concerns, but most of the time
humanitarian benefits were overshadowed by geo-political motivations.23 Since the
UN Security Council was incapable of obtaining a consensus on the use of force to
address threats to international peace, humanitarian intervention by the UN was not a
viable option; states and regional organizations were left on their own to develop
coercive techniques for conflict management.24 Therefore, during this period
scholarly debate on humanitarian intervention was focused on whether unilateral
intervention was lawful or not under the UN Charter. This debate was under the
impact of the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the ever-
present threat of a nuclear war between them.
With the end of the Cold War demands for humanitarian intervention have
increased and states turned to the United Nations to undertake humanitarian
interventions. They seek to legitimate interventions, spread the burden of the
operations and escape from the “intervention dilemma”. 25 According to Barry M.
Blechman, governments turned to the UN for the following reasons:26
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First, with the removal of the threat of Soviet veto, achieving an effective
collective security system appeared to be possible for the first time. Second, acting
through the UN has been a means of sharing the burden of maintaining international
stability- both the tangible burden in money and lives, and the political burden. It
also legitimates and sanctions military interventions in the eyes of public opinion.
Third reason is related to “intervention dilemma”, between pressures to act and a
distinctly remote possibility of acting successfully due to the difficulty of credibly
threatening the use of force. She explains:27
“Dealing with civil conflicts through the UN enables government decision
makers to shift the locus of responsibility. Turning to the UN, in effect, says
“we are acting, we are writing resolutions, stepping up pressures, etc.” At the
same time, if UN diplomacy, political pressures and other efforts prove
inadequate and the situation remains unacceptable, it appears not to be the
government’s failure, but the failure of the world body.”
In addition to these reasons, there were other factors contributing to the
increase in humanitarian action. First of all, extensive news coverage of wars and
crises has led to strong public pressure on outside governments to act.28 Assistance
and pressure from humanitarian organizations and NGOs like ICRC and MSF
(Doctors Without Borders), who pronounce “a duty to intervene”, displacement of
large number of people; refugee problem, and the “complex” nature of the crises
increased attention to humanitarian issues.
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These motives and an increasing demand for “humanitarian intervention”
resulted in a dramatic expansion in the number of UN’s humanitarian operations.
From 1991 to 1993, the UN’s annual military expenditures grew from about US$ 1
billion to close to US$ 4 billion.29 Because humanitarian interventions have been
undertaken mostly through UN peacekeeping, peacekeeping operations turned to be
more “muscular” and more ambitious than the “traditional” operations. But, the
range of conflicts around the world has far exceeded the UN’s capacity to address
them, and UN efforts to use peacekeeping forces in ongoing conflicts have exposed
the organization to the accusations of weakness and of failing to protect fundamental
human rights.30 After the debacle in Somalia the international community’s
eagerness to authorize UN “humanitarian intervention” missions quickly faded, and
Rwanda was the first case to be affected from this “reluctance to intervene”.
I.b. Definition of the Concept
As mentioned above, the concept of “humanitarian intervention” has had a
long history, which goes back to Grotius and Kant, and great attention, yet not a
commonly recognized definition. Evolution of the concept has gone parallel with the
changing understanding of sovereignty and development of human rights law. This
evolution expanded the definition of what constitutes a threat to peace, and the
increasing consideration of human rights issues at the UN reduced the limitations on
humanitarian intervention. But, in spite of this evolution, there is still no general
agreement among states on definition of what constitutes humanitarian intervention
and even on the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.
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 However, attempts by scholars to establish a “sole and unchallengeable”
definition merit consideration. An analysis of different definitions would outline the
important elements of the concept and help establish the necessary framework. To
this end, I shall examine these definitions and underline the different elements with
italic, upon which each of the definitions put its emphasis. Through this analysis, it
shall become clearer that definitions made by scholars can be categorized into two
groups: the “classic” definition which has an overwhelming position in the doctrine,
and the “new” and “broader” definition, recently emerged and challenging the “old”
one. Here are some definitions of “humanitarian intervention” made by outstanding
scholars:
Hedley Bull, “dictatorial or coercive interference in the sphere of jurisdiction
of a sovereign state motivated or legitimated by humanitarian concerns”.31
M. Akehurst, “the use of force to prevent states from...ill-treating its own
nationals”.32
David N. Gibbs, “forceful interference in the internal politics of one country
for humanitarian purposes”.33
Ian Brownlie, “the threat or use of armed force by a state, a belligerent
community or international organization with the objective to protect human
rights”.34
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N. J. Wheeler, “armed intervention to rescue individuals facing genocide or
mass oppression inside state borders”.35
Martha Finnemore, “military intervention to protect citizens other than their
own from humanitarian disasters”.36
Adam Roberts, “... military intervention in a state without the approval of its
authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among
inhabitants”.37
Bhikhu Parekh, “an act of intervention in the internal affairs of another
country with a view to ending the physical suffering caused by the disintegration or
the gross misuse of the authority of the state, and helping create conditions in which
a viable structure of civil authority can emerge”.38 “Humanitarian intervention is not
the same as humanitarian aid, which is only concerned to relieve suffering and not to
create peace and order, nor is it to be confused with political intervention, which
seeks to impose a specific structure of civil authority...”39
S. A. Garrett, “the injection of military power- or threat to such action- by
one or more outside states into the affairs of another state that has as its purpose (or
at least one of its principal purposes) the relieving of grave human suffering”.40
                                                          
35 Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent
on Humanitarian Intervention”, Millennium: Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1992, pp.
468-487.
36 Martha Finnemore, p. 153.
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Report of the Committee on Human Rights, “Humanitarian intervention
involves the use of force by a state to protect citizens of another state from
threatening situations within their own country”.41
Thomas G. Weiss, “ Coercive actions taken by the community of states... to
alter the domestic affairs, behavior or policies of a targeted government or
insurgency that has chosen to resist the expressed will of the international
community”.42
All these definitions point out some common elements of “humanitarian
intervention”, and together constitute what is called “classic definition” (in doctrine).
We can analyze all these common elements in the definition made by Sean D.
Murphy, a typical example of the “classic definition”.
According to Murphy, “ Humanitarian intervention is the threat or use of
force by a state, group of states, or international organization, primarily for the
purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from widespread deprivations
of internationally recognized human rights”.43
Each component of this definition merits brief discussion:
1. “Threat or use of force”: Given that “intervention” is a concept which
violates state sovereignty, its definition should reflect this fact;
“humanitarian intervention” is defined in terms of “forcible” means of
intervention.
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2. Actors: “state, a group of states or international organization”. Classic
definition does not include humanitarian actions taken by non-state actors
like NGOs. Because, although they play a key role in addressing
humanitarian crises, their intervention is qualitatively different from
intervention by states. They usually do not involve the use of force and
they seek consent.
3. Purpose:  “primarily” humanitarian. To prevent abuse “humanitarian
purpose” is accepted as a criterion defining humanitarian intervention. It
is qualified as “primarily” instead of “solely”, because, it is difficult to
identify an intervention where the prevention of widespread deprivations
internationally recognized human rights is the sole reason for the
intervention. Murphy notes that one should be flexible while interpreting
this criterion.44
4. “Nationals of a target state”: “classic” definition does not include
interventions to protect or rescue one’s own nationals.
5. “Widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights”;
definition is used to “capture the myriad of conditions that might arise
where human rights on a large scale are in jeopardy”45, and reflects the
rights-based approach.
6. The issue of consent: According to “classic” approach, definition of
humanitarian intervention should be limited to situations where the local
governing authorities of the target state have not authorized or consented
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to the interference in its affairs. Murphy explains “When one speaks of a
“threat or use of force against a state” there must be a lack of
authorization or consent by authorities of that state; otherwise the threat is
not really a threat, and “the use of force” is better characterized as
military cooperation”.46
In addition to this literature on “classic” definition, in 1990s there emerged a
growing literature, which defines “humanitarian intervention” more broadly to cover
“non-forcible means” and “non-state actors”. This new literature caused a
“terminological turmoil”. Lori Fisler Damrosch defines this turmoil as “profound
normative confusion”, and writes “international lawyers have usually employed the
term “humanitarian intervention” with reference to the application of force in order
to terminate genocide and comparable atrocities, while the same term is now in
general use to mean the delivery of food and medicines to deprived populations”.47
This new literature offers criteria for “non-forcible humanitarian
intervention” by international aid agencies, refers to “physical intervention with
consent” and writes about “NGO humanitarian intervention”48. It defines
“humanitarian intervention” comprising any possible form of humanitarian action in
an emergency situation, not necessarily involving use of armed force and not
necessarily against the will of the government.49
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Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse belong to this new literature. They
put forward a “reconceptualization” of the term as follows:50
“Whereas in classic terminology “humanitarian intervention” means “forcible self-
help by states across international borders to protect indigenous human rights, in the
rest of the book “humanitarian intervention” means cross-border action by the
international community in response to human suffering, made up of (i) “forcible
humanitarian intervention”, an expanded version of the classic concept to include
collective action as well as self-help and no longer confined to human rights abuse by
governments, and (ii) “non-forcible humanitarian intervention”.”
Kofi Annan, is another figure who advocates broader definition. He redefines
“humanitarian intervention” to include “actions along a wide continuum from the
most pacific to the most coercive” and proposes to move the UN from “a culture of
reaction to a culture of prevention”.51
Bruce D. Jones, argues that the “classic” definition is unable to account for
the scope and complexity of humanitarian intervention in general, and humanitarian
action in Rwanda in particular.52 He offers “a richer body of empirical analysis”
which include non-state actors and non-forcible means, and in which the state is not
viewed as a unitary actor. Jones criticizes the “traditional” approach which adopts
“classic” definition for it ignores the fact that “aid agencies are indeed in competition
and cooperation with the military elements of the state; political battles between
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competing branches of foreign policy decision-making play a key role in determining
response, and political actors act out of their own concerns and interests”.53
Jones categorizes “humanitarian intervention” actions into four groups: 1)
unarmed and pacific interventions: include mediation or facilitation by non-state
actors, and some conventional diplomatic processes, 2) unarmed and coercive
interventions: include such actions as trade sanctions, 3) armed and pacific
interventions: include peacekeeping operations with the consent of the parties to the
conflict, eg., OAU Neutral Military Observer Group in Rwanda (NMOG), UN
Observer Mission to Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), and UNAMIR,  4) armed and
coercive interventions: include the use of force against the will of at least one party
to the conflict (French Operation Turquoise in Rwanda).
Such a broad definition, which includes even diplomatic means like
mediation into the definition has blurred the concept, and increased its difficulties.
Adam Roberts states that “the term has come to be used with a much broader and
less precise meaning”. Thomas Weiss, Comfort Ero and Suzanne Long, too, prefer
“classic” definition, because its better delimitation provides opportunity to make
healthier analyses. 54
Establishing a conceptual framework to develop an analytical account of the
Rwanda case requires a choice between the “classic” and “new” definitions. The
result of the analysis would change according to the definition chosen. Therefore, it
is a critical methodological choice. This study aims at to examine the response of the
United Nations to the genocide in Rwanda. The scope of the thesis is limited to UN’s
actions during the crisis; it does not include NGOs or other actors. It does not cover
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post-conflict response; rehabilitation to support repatriation and return of refugees
and internally displaced persons, rehabilitation of the economy, efforts to establish a
fair and effective judicial system and mine clearance either. Thus, for the purpose of
this paper the discussion will be limited to the “classic” definition; “UN-authorized
coercive intervention for primarily humanitarian purposes”.
 I.c. Legal Bases, Permissible Standards of and Criteria for
Humanitarian Intervention
Is there a right of “humanitarian intervention” by outside armed forces? If
there is, when force is justified? What circumstances should give rise to a right of
forcible humanitarian intervention? Who in the international community decides
when these circumstances have been met, when a certain threshold of behavior has
been passed that justifies intervention in the sovereign affairs of a nation state? How
is it possible to prevent abuse; to keep “great powers” from using the “humanitarian
objective” as a guise to intervene for political reasons? What are the legal bases of
humanitarian intervention? Is collective authorization required to legitimize forcible
“humanitarian intervention”? Must there be a threat to international peace and
security for the UN to consider forcible intervention?  And finally, what are the
limits of that intervention? These are important questions, whose answers are
difficult but essential for establishing an analytical framework of “humanitarian
intervention”.
Some human rights, such as the right to life, to physical integrity and the
absence of torture or degrading treatment, are regarded as part of international jus
cogens (part of the body of peremptory international law from which no derogations
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are permitted).55 They are erga omnes obligations that all states have a legitimate
interest in their implementation. And genocide constitutes a gross violation of these
human rights and international jus cogens. Therefore, human rights conventions and
other documents like the 1966 Covenants, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (1948), the Geneva Conventions, the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide (1948), which brings the obligation to prevent
and punish the crime of genocide, Preamble to the Charter of the UN, Articles 55 and
56 of the UN Charter, and An Agenda for Peace, which declares that gross violations
of international humanitarian law compels the international community to take “all
means necessary” to protect the civilian victims of the conflict and enforce peace are
considered as legal bases of “the right of humanitarian intervention”.56
The question, “what circumstances should give rise to a right of forcible
humanitarian intervention?” brings a discussion on the criteria for “justifiable”
intervention. Pugwash Study Group on Intervention, Sovereignty and International
Security offers four categories of criteria justifying humanitarian intervention:57 1)
gross and systemic human rights abuses, including genocide, such as occurred in
Cambodia and Rwanda; 2) the suppression of the clearly demonstrated will of the
majority, such as the overthrow of the democratically-elected government in Haiti; 3)
clear cases of failed states, where central authority is non-functioning and the civilian
population is at the mercy of militias, warlords, criminal gangs, etc. (Somalia,
Liberia, Sierra Leone); 4) the illegal and inhumane use of power by one side or the
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other during a civil war encompassing an attempt at secession and/or ethnic/religious
self determination.
According to John N. Moore, intervention for the protection of human rights
is permissible if it meets the following conditions:58
A. An immediate threat of genocide or other widespread arbitrary deprivation of
human life in violation of international law,
B. An exhaustion of diplomatic and other peaceful techniques for protecting the
threatened rights to the extent possible and consistent with protection of the
threatened rights,
C. A proportional use of force which does not threaten greater destruction of values
than the human rights at stake and which does not exceed the minimum force
necessary to protect the threatened rights,
D. The minimal effect on authority structures necessary to protect the threatened
rights,
E. The minimal interference with self-determination necessary to protect the
threatened rights,
F. A prompt disengagement, consistent with the purpose of the action, and
G. Immediate full reporting to the Security Council and any appropriate regional
organization and compliance with Security Council and applicable regional
directives.
The European Parliament Resolution on the Right of Humanitarian
Intervention (A3-0227/94) is an important development in terms of “codification” of
regulations on humanitarian intervention. European Parliament issued the resolution
after the hearing held in the Parliament on 25 January 1994. The Resolution, which
urges the European Commission and Council to adopt a position favoring the
recognition of the right of humanitarian intervention and calls on them to set some
criteria for humanitarian intervention, states its reasons as follows: 59
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1) International law has traditionally followed the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, however, the traditional
justification of national sovereignty for giving carte blanche to all internal abuses is
no longer acceptable,
 2) It is generally accepted that human rights, as defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the UN International Conventions on civil and
political rights and economic and cultural rights, are universal, and important
international documents such as the Helsinki Final Act include provisions according
to which the human right situation in a country does not form part of its internal
affairs.60
EP Resolution then defines the concept of humanitarian intervention as “the
protection, including the threat or use of force, by a state or group of states of the
basic human rights of persons who are subjects of and/or resident in another
state”.61After stating that intervention should take place on the initiative of the UN
Security Council, the resolution sets a number of criteria for humanitarian
intervention, in order to “encourage international developments towards
“codification” of such criteria”. It is interesting and meaningful that the criteria set
by the European Parliament in this resolution are almost the same as the criteria
enumerated by John N. Moore in 1974. It implies that these are the criteria on which
scholars have reached a “consensus”. The criteria (in the resolution) are:62
(a) there must be an extraordinary and extremely serious situation of
humanitarian need in a country where those in power can not be made to
see the reason other than through military means;
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(b) all other means must, in so far as possible or reasonable, have been
exhausted and must have failed;
(c) the inventor must be relatively disinterested in the situation in so far as the
protection of human rights should be the primary objective;
(d) states which have been formally condemned by the international
community for unlawful intervention in a region must not be allowed to
take part in humanitarian intervention in other regions until they have put
an end to all their unlawful operations; (this is a new criteria)
(e) intervention must be limited to specific objectives and must only have
minimal political consequences for the authority of the state concerned;
(f) the use of force must be temporary and not be disproportionate;
(g) the intervention must be reported immediately to the UN and not be subject
to UN condemnation;
(h) the intervention must not represent a threat to international peace and
security to the extent that it causes a greater loss of life and greater
suffering than that which it aims to prevent.
There seems to be a consensus on these criteria among scholars, but not
among states. It is difficult to codify such a set of criteria for legally justified
humanitarian intervention. Because, although some states take the view that
codifying such criteria, which would guide UN humanitarian intervention actions, is
necessary to reduce the selective nature of these actions, a number of states are
against codifying, even formulating such criteria, as doing so might provide potential
intervenors extra incentive.
Not only the attempts to codify criteria for humanitarian intervention, but the
criteria themselves are problematic. For example, the principle of “neutrality” or
“impartiality” is one of these principles.  It is argued that “impartiality” can be a
“destructive misconception” when belligerents are still fighting. Matthew Klimow
explains “An intervention to assist victims of atrocities such as starvation, torture,
mass murder and/or ethnic cleansing puts the intervening force in the struggle. It is
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impossible to enter a bitter conflict that has produced horrendous atrocities without
taking sides; to think otherwise shows a misconception of impartiality.”63
Assessment of intervention operations is another problematic issue. It would
be wrong to classify operations as successes or failures without reference to some
kind of objective standard. What is successful intervention? Is it possible to set some
criteria to judge success/failure of intervention? Thomas Weiss lists three criteria: 1)
durability of results, 2) relative effectiveness, and 3) comprehensiveness of the UN
inputs.64 Pugwash Study Group on Intervention, Sovereignty and International
Security proposes two criteria for assessing the “success” or “failure” of any
humanitarian intervention; 1) the number of lives saved, and 2) whether the
intervention helps create post-conflict political stability.65 Brown identified three
criteria for determining success: Was the mandate fulfilled, as specified by the
appropriate Security Council decision? Did the operation lead to a resolution of the
underlying disputes of the conflict? Did the presence of the operation contribute to
the maintenance of international peace and security by reducing or eliminating
conflict in the area of operation? Diehl developed two criteria: Was the operation
able to limit armed conflict? Did the operation facilitate conflict resolution? These
examples show that academics develop different criteria for success, making it
difficult to assess any humanitarian intervention action.
          I.d. Arguments for and against “humanitarian intervention”
The ambiguities of the concept have given rise to arguments for and against
“humanitarian intervention”. The debate evolves around the interpretation of Article
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2 (4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits threat or use of force, and Article 2 (7),
which establishes the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states.
The “narrow” and “broad” interpretations of these articles reflect two different
approaches: “statist” approach and “rights-based” approach. “Statist” approach
focuses on the principle of non-intervention (and the prohibition of use of force), as
both centerpiece of international order and the primary determinant of state action.
According to this view, intervention is not only a violation of international law, it is
an act of violence against the cardinal rules of international order itself. Whereas,
“rights-based approach” argues that “individuals have inalienable rights that must be
observed and protected by all governments. As a result, all governments can be held
to certain standards of behavior involving basic human rights and democratic
processes”.66 When a country falls into such disarray that no governing body can end
a humanitarian tragedy and guarantee human rights, the world community itself is
accountable; sovereignty should not block the protection of human rights.67
Proponents of humanitarian intervention emphasize that while one purpose of
the Charter is to prevent war, the Charter and the human rights instruments it
spawned accord great significance to the protection of human rights.   Therefore,
intervention for humanitarian purposes would not contravene Article 2 (4) of the UN
Charter, if it fulfills conditions required for its exercise. Reisman, relying upon the
purposes of the UN stated in the Preamble of the Charter and in several articles,
indicates that “Article 2 (4) is not against the use of force per se, but rather the use of
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force for unlawful purposes”.68 He argues further that “since humanitarian
intervention seeks neither a territorial change nor a challenge to the political
independence of the state involved and is not only consistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations but also in conformity with the most fundamental peremptory norms
of the Charter, it is distortion to argue that it is precluded by Article 2 (4).”69
Article 2 (7) is another basis upon which opponents of humanitarian
intervention built their arguments. Here, the debate focuses on whether human rights
issues and their protection are matters lying within the domestic jurisdiction of states.
The provision also related to “sovereignty”. It is increasingly accepted that human
rights issues are no longer within the domestic jurisdiction of states, and sovereignty
is no longer a safe diplomatic sanctuary when abuse of civilians occurs. Prohibition
of use of force, inviolability of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention
are still of great importance in international relations. They however are open to
various interpretations.
Academics who support “humanitarian intervention” argues further that the
idea of humanitarian intervention is not necessarily the incorrigible enemy of the
general rules of non-intervention and prohibition of use of force. A main foundation
of the non-intervention rule has been a concern about states acting unilaterally. If an
intervention is authorized by an international body and has specific purposes, this
concern begins to dissolve. Since the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council
has emerged as the main body authorizing humanitarian interventions.  The role of
the UN, especially the Security Council has given a degree of international
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legitimacy to the uses of force that might otherwise have been open to extensive
criticism, and reduced the risks of competitive chaos and pursuit of unilateral
advantage.
“Arguments against” humanitarian intervention reflect concerns that
“humanitarian intervention” would open the door to aggression and war by
destroying the prohibition of force. Many states have been uneasy about an emerging
UN practice that might one day threaten their own sovereignty.70 “Third World
countries” with memories of external domination are on the side of opponents, for
they fear that outsiders, in the name of humanitarianism could find more or less
plausible grounds for intervention and, such an abuse could get out of hand.71 They
also referred to problems of humanitarian intervention, especially “uneven response”
by international community. Inconsistencies in the selection of cases and confusions
in the definition of missions lead to questioning “how viable an option is
humanitarian intervention”.72 Russia and China are among the countries object to
humanitarian intervention, and calling for “respect for territorial integrity of
sovereign states”.73 According to authors like Stephen Solarz these two states fear
that the international community might use the emerging doctrine of humanitarian
intervention to limit their ability to deal as they wish with troublesome provinces,
such as Tibet, Chechenya, and Dagestan.74 In addition to these arguments, some
academics argue that reliance on outside forces to resolve local conflicts is futile,
saying “... only a military victory by one party can ultimately resolve civic strife;
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someone must win and someone must lose, otherwise the war was simply be fought
another day”.75
Adam Roberts in his article “The Road to Hell... A Critique of Humanitarian
Intervention” enumerates problems and defects of humanitarian intervention as
follows:76
1) Foreign military involvement in the name of humanitarianism is open to
be abused because of the vagueness of its definition.
2) Intervention is a failure of prevention (as Kofi Annan argues), and it only
provides a short-term solution. The complete absence of a serious long-
term policy in respect to the target country brings up the question whether
these interventions do really provide what is needed: security.
3) Demarcation line between the principle of non-intervention and
humanitarian intervention should be drawn clearly. The phrase commonly
used in literature “situations that shock the conscience of mankind” is not
adequate to define the criteria for humanitarian intervention.
4) “Selectivity” or “double-standards” is another ground for doubt about the
recent practice. Humanitarian intervention seems for the most part to be
confined to cases in which there has been extensive television coverage,
where there is some particular interest in intervention, and in which there
is not likely to be dissent among powers or massive military opposition.
In short, it may largely be confined to highly publicized situations of
chaos and disintegration.
5) UN Security Council authorization regulates the practice of humanitarian
intervention but also shifts the problem to the nature of the Security
Council as an arena of the hegemony of the permanent members.
6) Another problem with recent UN practice involving elements of
humanitarian intervention is that it is extremely hard to divine anything
like a doctrine from so variegated a set of cases and approaches. There are
plenty of references to exceptional circumstances, but no general defense
of  “humanitarian intervention”. In other words, Security Council does not
want any case to be viewed as a precedent for future actions.
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I.e. The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention
As mentioned above, with the end of the Cold War demands for humanitarian
intervention have increased and states turned to the United Nations to undertake
humanitarian interventions.77 The result has been a dramatically increased demand
for UN action. An overburdened UN has had difficulties to meet the increasing
demand. And, as a result, Weiss says, there emerged “a fantastic gap between the
resolutions of the Security Council, the will to execute those resolutions, and the
means available to commanders in the field”.78
Limited means and constraints preventing effective UN action made the
Organization more “cautious”. Following the debacle in Somalia and failures in
Bosnia, the UN decided that “great care is required before making commitments
because, civil wars are a complicated terrain for the UN or anyone else.”79 And, as
mentioned before Rwanda is the first emergency to be affected from this cautious
approach.
At present, the UN has no standing force of its own; instead it relies on its
members to supply the appropriate forces when called upon to do so. The UN is thus
dependent on the willingness of its members to supply military forces when
requested, but it can not enforce such a request.80 This fact should be considered
while assessing success/failure of UN operations and criticizing it for “selective”
nature of humanitarian intervention.
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Because of its limited means and dependency on member states, the UN
cannot intervene in every crisis that meets the above-mentioned criteria for justifiable
humanitarian intervention, as in Rwanda. This answers the question, “why not in
Rwanda?”; “why get involved in one country, while leaving others often in far worse
condition, to the ravages of civil war and human rights violations?”. Among the
reasons for “uneven response”, what determines the “selection” of the crises to
intervene is “politics”.
Kofi Annan highlights four reasons for the uneven response of the
international community, and the UN.81 According to Annan, 1)“doubts about claims
of national sovereignty and the attendant growth in human rights that occur unevenly
around the world”, 2) “the unpredictable play of national interests, the uneven
implementation of human-rights claims, the TV audience, and the valence of state
sovereignty”, 3) “the limited powers of the UN, especially the threat of a Security
Council veto, constraining a rapid response”, and 4) “the shortage of effective
international mechanisms to remedy the civil strife that brings them about” will
shape the response of the UN.82
To solve these problems and enable the UN to conduct humanitarian
interventions effectively, the Organization should be given the necessary means.
Otherwise, the complaints about “uneven” response will continue. If we compare the
means available for “UN humanitarian intervention” with demands for action, we
could see the limits of intervention.
The Charter confers upon the Security Council the “primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security” (Chapter V, Article 24). To
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achieve this end, the Council is allowed to benefit from UN member states as well as
regional organizations. Although the Charter does not expressly permit the Security
Council to authorize enforcement actions by member states, the Council has derived
such authority from its broad range of Chapter VII powers. In short, the main body
able to take action in terms of humanitarian intervention is the UN Security Council.
In order to act under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council’s action
must be premised on a formal determination of the existence of a threat to
international peace and security. In case of genocide, 1948 Genocide Convention
constitutes another basis for Security Council action. Article VIII of the Convention
states that any contracting state “may call upon the competent organs of the United
Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider
appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide.”
Some academics like Sean D. Murphy ask whether the General Assembly
could take an active role by recommending humanitarian intervention under the
“Uniting for Peace Resolution”. Stating that “the legality of the General Assembly
issuing “recommendations” for humanitarian intervention by states, under such a
resolution is by no means free from doubt”, he argues it is not a viable option. But,
he adds, this does not leave the General Assembly without a role. He says,
 “As a general matter the General Assembly and its committees are more actively
engaged in the consideration of human rights issues than is the Security Council.
Through the General Assembly, it is possible for egregious situations of human rights
deprivations to be placed to the global agenda and hence on the Security Council
agenda. Further, if the Security Council is deadlocked on whether to authorize
humanitarian intervention due to the recalcitrance of one or a few Security Council
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members, a widely supported General Assembly resolution recommending such action
could tip the scales in favor of intervention”. 83
The limited means available for the UN can be summarized as follows:
1. Article 43 of the UN Charter: Chapter VII envisages the negotiation of
special agreements under Article 43, by which states commit to provide military
forces and logistical support to the UN when called upon to do so. Conclusion of
Article 43 agreements could allow for co-ordination and training of a multinational
force in advance of a humanitarian crisis, along with resolution of command and
control issues and rules of engagement. It could also facilitate burden sharing and
planning.84 But, since no such agreements exist, the UN has had to develop different
means for conducting “humanitarian intervention”.
2. United Nations deploys forces under its own command for an
enforcement action. In such operations, the forces are provided to the UN under ad
hoc voluntary arrangements between the UN and several states, and are supported by
voluntary financial contributions from states. Authors agree that most of the
difficulties experienced in humanitarian interventions are attributable to the ad hoc
nature of the deployment of the forces. Murphy argues,
“When the SC decides to deploy forces, they must be hastily recruited and
often are of uneven quality... Further, forces from various countries rarely have
had the opportunity to train with each other and often suffer logistical and
linguistic difficulties in communicating among themselves and with the local
population”.
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3. The UN Security Council authorizes states to deploy forces under their
own command in support of its resolutions. This type of authorization was the nature
of the French Operation Turquoise in June 1994. Security Council would also
authorize “regional arrangements or agencies” to undertake peace operations under
Chapter VIII, Article 52.
4. UN Peacekeeping: After the end of the Cold War peacekeeping
operations have become “second-generation operations”, “new peacekeeping” or
“multifunctional peacekeeping”, mixing together military, civil administration and
humanitarian components. Simultaneously demands for humanitarian action
increased, and  “humanitarian interventions” have been undertaken in the context of
peacekeeping operations, although intervention differs in key aspects from classical
peacekeeping.85 This led to a debate on whether UN peacekeeping is a suitable
means to undertake humanitarian interventions or not.
Neither peacekeeping operations nor humanitarian intervention are explicitly
envisaged in the UN Charter. Nevertheless, there is an appropriate mechanism within
the framework of Chapter VI, “The Pacific Settlement of Disputes”. Specifically
Peacekeeping operations are amongst the peaceful options under Article 33, which
provides for “other peaceful means” in which the consent of the parties in conflict is
the key issue. Operations that come under Article 42 in Chapter VII of the Charter,
“Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression”, are
enforcement actions and “humanitarian intervention” operations fall into this
category.
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Some authors like Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse define “UN
peacekeeping” as a form of “humanitarian intervention”, and call it “non-forcible
military intervention”.86 Bruce D. Jones is another author who categorize
peacekeeping as “armed and pacific interventions”, a means of humanitarian
intervention.87 However, dominant views in the doctrine of “humanitarian
intervention” state that “UN humanitarian intervention is not peacekeeping”. 88
Murphy explains the distinction between humanitarian intervention and
peacekeeping, by contradicting the fundamental principles guiding them, as
follows:89
“Peacekeeping operations are predicated on the consent of the host government; the
forces deployed by the UN usually are small in number, lightly armed, and have
limited rules of engagement. They seek not to alter conditions so much as to maintain
a status quo, perhaps in order to allow for a peaceful transition to an orderly situation.
By contrast, humanitarian intervention often requires the large-scale deployment of
military forces capable of suppressing the regular or irregular forces of a country.
Whether called “peacemaking”, “peace-enforcing” or “new peacekeeping”, what is
necessary is essentially an armed invasion of a country to impose a change in
conditions. Expectations about the requirements for, and the ease of, such a mission
must be radically different from that of a peacekeeping operation.”
The conclusion that use of UN peacekeeping is not a suitable means to
undertake humanitarian intervention, is a valid argument because deployment of a
peacekeeping force (UNAMIR) is commonly accepted as one of the main reasons for
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the failure of the international community to prevent or stop the genocide in Rwanda.
The Report of Independent Inquiry states that “the UNAMIR mission was a
peacekeeping operation. It was not equipped, trained or staffed to conduct
intervention operations. According to its rules of engagement it was not to fire until
fired upon”.90 And, certainly this limited mandate did not give enough power to the
mission to stop the violence in Rwanda. As the situation deteriorated, UNAMIR
commanders demanded a stronger mandate for the force and permission to take a
more active and deterrent operations. However, the Secretariat maintained the
interpretation of the mandate that “UNAMIR could only support the efforts of the
gendarmerie”.91
In addition to the limited means available to the UN, there are a number of
problems affecting intervention behavior:
Consensus building problems faced by the international community: There
does seem to be convergence within the international community on the criteria for
intervening in the case of gross human rights abuses, but the problem is one of
agencies and modalities.
Dependency on members’ willingness: As mentioned before, the means for
UN intervention is limited, and the organization has no standing forces of its own.
Instead it relies on its members to supply the appropriate forces. In Rwanda case,
Belgium’s abrupt withdrawal from UNAMIR I and the delay in the deployment of
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UNAMIR II92 illustrates how much UN security activities depend on the willingness
of member states to provide the necessary forces. Murphy summarizes “When it
comes to intervention the UN is mostly the sum of its parts”93
Reluctance to intervene: Domestic political constraints are very palpable
throughout the West, where recessionary and budgetary requirements directly clash
with the need for outside help in what seems like a never-ending series of crises
around the world.94 This reluctance emerges when “intervention dilemma” outweighs
in the decision-making process.
The US’ role: American support (political, financial and military) to UN
operations has been important for their success. The US also influences other states’
attitudes toward crises and new missions. It pays the largest single share of UN
peacekeeping expenses, and its military logistic capabilities are often essential for the
success of the UN operations. Therefore, when the US does not support an
intervention, this undermines the success of the operation.95
Weiss emphasized the importance of the US role as follows: “...its leadership
is still the sine qua non of meaningful UN actions, particularly those involving
significant military forces.... as has become obvious in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and
now Rwanda, if the United States does not participate in the toughest assignments,
few others will”.96 Lack of US leadership was one of the reasons for failure in
Rwanda. “Somalia syndrome” showed its impact through famous presidential
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declaration: PDD-25,97 which puts strict limitations on US participation and
contributions to the UN peace operations, and operations in Rwanda.
Co-ordination problems: “Complex emergencies” such as Rwanda require the
coordination of the work of organizations like UNHCR, UNDP, WHO and FAO.
Within the UN, NGOs and military institutions, there are wide ranges of conflicting
and contradictory perspectives on problems and solutions and a multiplicity of
functional units.98
Financial problems: In addition to members’ reluctance, it is getting more
and more difficult to provide adequate funding for these costly operations. Following
figures show how dramatically “the reluctance to intervene”, especially after the
intervention in Somalia, affected the funding of the operations. Adam Roberts
explains the financial crisis as follows:
 “Humanitarian budgets” of the international agencies and NGOs reached an
unprecedentedly high level in the early 1990s. There was a peak in 1993,
followed by a slight decline. “The overall budget of UNHCR reached
US$1,307 million in 1993, dropping to $1,166 million in 1994 and $1,140
million in 1995. Similarly, the overall budget of ICRC increased from under
400 million Swiss francs (SFr) in each of the years 1986-1988 to SFr 811
million in 1993; since then it has declined to SFr 794 million in 1994, and SFr
641 million in 1995”.99
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Murphy summarized the problems of the UN, in terms of “humanitarian
intervention” as follows:100
   “The Security Council... the vehicle for authorizing such interventions, has
little experience with the management of such crises. It is reliant on a few
major powers for the economic and military support that is needed to
accomplish large-scale interventions. The domination of those powers raises
serious questions about the legitimacy of the process by which the Security
Council authorizes humanitarian intervention.”
These problems constitute serious difficulties preventing effective and timely
action by the UN to address humanitarian crises. Thus, “selective” nature of UN
interventions and their success/failure should be assessed within the limits set by
these problems. All the above-mentioned problems played a role in Rwanda case.
Reluctance to intervene, lack of US leadership, inadequate resources, UN’s
dependency on its members, financial crises in the overburdened UN, co-ordination
problems, and “inadequate mandate” of the UNAMIR, together explain the failure in
Rwanda in general terms. It is however impossible to fully understand the
shortcomings of the UN operations in Rwanda without examining the peculiarities of
the specific case.
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CHAPTER II
HISTORY OF THE RWANDA CRISIS
II.a. History of the Ethnic Conflict:
Rwanda is the smallest African country south of the Sahara (just under
25.000 square kilometers). With a population that was close to 7.5 million before the
genocide and about 6.5 million after it, including approximately 1.5 million refugees
(most of whom were repatriated from Zaire- now Democratic Republic of Congo-
Tanzania and Burundi) it remains one of the most densely populated countries in the
continent (over 250 people per square kilometer).1 Because 90 per cent the workforce
is in agriculture, the competition for land has always been intense.2 And, to many
observers, the lack of available land contributed to the political tensions that led to
genocide.3
The population of Rwanda consists of three ethnic groups: Hutu (on the eve
of the genocide, 84 % of the population), Tutsi (15 %), and Twa (1 %).4 This ethnic
division is a social and political reality, but the genocide in Rwanda is not “a simple
case of tribal or ethnic conflict”.5 These three ethnic groups share a single language
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(Kinyarwanda) and culture, and are not regionally concentrated in specific areas.6
This ethnic division does not coincide with a religious division either; majority of the
population is Christian.7 Hutus and Tutsis did not have a mutual hatred for each
other.8 There is no documentation of any significant armed conflict between them of
the same magnitude as that of the post-colonial period.9 It is commonly accepted that
the root causes of the “ethnic hatred” originate from the ethnic favoritism toward the
Tutsi exhibited first by German and then Belgian colonizers, as a means of “divide
and rule” policy.10 According to Weiss, “decades of European colonialism reinforced
the social bases of differences in society to such an extent that a persuasive case can
be made for its transformation”.11
History of the ethnic conflict in Rwanda shows that the reality of “imagined
communities” has concrete consequences. Human Rights Watch explains these
consequences very well:
“Hutu killed Tutsi, because of a common fear rooted in firmly held but
mistaken ideas of the Rwandan past. Organizers of the genocide, who had
themselves grown up with these distortions of history, skillfully exploited
misconceptions about who the Tutsi were, where they had come from, and
what they had done in the past. From these elements, they fueled the fear and
hatred that made genocide imaginable.”12
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Therefore, in order to understand how such genocide could take place we must begin
with history of ethnic conflict.
II.a.1. The Meaning of “Hutu”, “Tutsi” and “Twa:
It is important to examine how this “ethnic hatred” killing approximately one
million people in three months emerged. What was the real meaning of the words
“Hutu”, “Tutsi” and “Twa”? In what ways and for what reasons has this meaning
changed and resulted in genocide? Answers imply that politicians used, actually
“created” this “ethnic hatred” to distract the people’s attention and save their position
in times of political crises.
In early times, as now, most people in the region were cultivators who also
raised small stock and occasionally a few cattle. A far smaller number of people
depended on large herds of cattle for their livelihood.13 And the words, “Hutu”,
“Tutsi” and “Twa” used to indicate social status of individuals, rather than their
“ethnic identity”. The word “Tutsi” which apparently first described a person rich in
the cattle, became a term that referred to the elite group as a whole, and the word
“Hutu”- meaning originally a subordinate or follower of a more powerful person-
came to refer to the mass of ordinary people. The word “Twa” referred to forest
dwellers who lived by hunting.14
In short, in pre-colonial and early colonial times, a high degree of economic
specialization characterized the groups. The boundary between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa
was flexible and permeable at that time, and intermarriages were commonplace.15
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But with the colonial rule both the meaning and the flexible character of this
classification changed.16
Germany controlled Ruanda-Urundi (Rwanda and Burundi) during the period
of 1899-1916, ended with the loss of the colonies at the end of the First World War.
Germans decided to administer the country indirectly, through the “elite” Tutsi, and
began to favor Tutsi over Hutu and Twa.17 Then the League of Nations awarded a
mandate over Ruanda-Urundi to Belgium. Belgium (1916-1961) “developed” the
system of “indirect rule” by some regulations in the name of administrative
efficiency.18 It decided to limit administrative posts and higher education to the
Tutsi, and in order to determine exactly who Tutsi was it began to register everyone,
noting their group affiliation in writing, once and for all. All Rwandans born
subsequently would also be registered as Tutsi, Hutu or Twa at the time of their birth.
The system was put into effect in the 1930s, with each Rwandan asked to declare his
group identity.  Some 15 per cent of the population declared themselves Tutsi,
approximately 84 per cent said they were Hutu, and the remaining 1 per cent said
they were Twa.19
The recording of the “ethnic” groups in written form enhanced their
importance and changed their character; they were no longer flexible.20 Any social
mobility of earlier times ended as Hutu were largely denied access to education and
other opportunities. Under colonial rule, virtually the only people to gain wealth
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were Tutsi.21 These circumstances entrenched ethnicity into the political and social
culture.
Europeans developed a theologically inspired “Hamitic” theory in order to
justify their domination and “indirect rule”, favoring Tutsi over Hutu and Bantu.
According to this theory
“Hamite Tutsi were responsible for bringing the rudiments of civilization to
the region. Tutsi were presumed to be the remnants of a lost tribe of Israel,
the descendants of Ham-Noah’s son, banished to the south of the Promised
Land. Following this hypothesis descendants of Ham, being Caucasian, had
an easy time conquering the less intelligent Negroid peoples that they
encountered in their inorexible move southward. As they move southward
the Hamites supposedly became darker skinned, although they did not lose
all their Caucasian attributes....The Hamitic Tutsi, whose Caspian affinities
naturally predisposed them to rule were superior to the Bantu Hutu whose
stocky physiques naturally predisposed them to hard work and the pogmoid
Twa who as an atavistic throwback to the ape were a pariah race destined to
disappear.”22
This theory was disseminated through schools and seminaries, and was
accepted by Hutu, who stood to suffer from it, as well as by the Tutsi who were
bound to profit from it.
II.a.2. “Hutu Revolution”:
Belgium continued to support the Tutsi until the 1950s. Then faced with the
end of colonial rule and with the pressure from the United Nations, which supervised
the administration of Rwanda under the trusteeship system, the colonial
administrators began to increase possibilities for Hutu to participate in public life;23
“they named several Hutu to responsible positions in the administration, they began
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to admit more Hutu into schools and they conducted limited elections for advisory
government councils”.24 These changes were enough to frighten the Tutsi, yet not
enough to satisfy the Hutu. In their struggle for power Hutus formed their own party,
the Parmehutu (Parti du mouvement de l’émancipation des Bahutu). Members of the
Tutsi elite too organized themselves with the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR).25
Although some attempt was made to form a multi-ethnic political party, the situation
between the ethnic groups was so polarized that the party attracted few supporters.26
Violence between Hutu and Tutsi political groups broke out in 1959, when
several Tutsi assaulted a Hutu sub-chief. This provoked reprisals on the part of the
Hutu against UNAR.27 Soon, generalized attacks against Tutsi civilians spread to
other parts of the country; thousands of Tutsi were killed and tens of thousands fled
to safety in neighboring countries. In order to restore order, the Belgian
administration replaced half the Tutsi local authorities by Hutu.28 With the help of
these local administrators, the Parmehutu won the UN sponsored elections in 1961.
Belgian mandate was terminated and Rwanda became independent in 1962. The
Tutsi king fled the country and the first Hutu president of Rwanda, Gregorie
Kayibanda, assumed power; these events became known as the “Hutu Revolution”.29
The new government continued labeling all Rwandans as Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, but
the identity cards which had once served to guarantee privilege to Tutsi now served
as a means to discriminate against them, both in employment and education.30
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Following the “Hutu Revolution”, armed Tutsi refugee groups (called
“inyenzi” or “cockroaches” by Hutu authorities) organized raids into Rwanda from
just beyond the border in Burundi, Tanzania or Zaire. Each raid provoked reprisal
violence against Tutsi still resident in Rwanda; they were accused of having aided
the invaders (being “ibyitso”) -the same kind of charges often repeated during the
genocide in 1994. Hutu leaders used these attacks to bolster the sense of Hutu
solidarity, by exploiting the fear of “inyenzi” for their political ends.31 According to
Human Rights Watch,
“From these attacks they crafted the myth of the Hutu revolution as a long and
courageous struggle against ruthless forces of repression. For them, the battle
had been legitimate as well as brave: the Hutu, as the “great majority”, the
“rubanda nyamwinshi”, had the right to rule over the minority. In their eyes,
the ethnic majority was necessarily the same as the democratic majority”.32
In the early 1970s when Kayibanda began to face with increasing criticism of
the regime and charges that he favored southern over northern Hutus (he was from
the south) he used the anti-Tutsi propaganda again.33 His regime accused Tutsi of
holding a disproportionate number of jobs in schools, private sector, and Rwandan
Catholic Church hierarchy, and many Tutsi were fired and harassed.34 But, this did
not help him to keep in power. The campaign of intimidation and assaults on Tutsi in
early 1973 turned into a panic; once again thousands streamed across the borders.
Seizing the opportunity, Kayibanda’s Defense Minister Juvenal Habyarimana took
control of the country in a “bloodless” coup detat.35
II.a.3. Habyarimana in Control:
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Two years after the coup, in 1975, Habyarimana made Rwanda officially a
single-party state under the National Revolutionary Movement for Development
(Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement, MRND). Over the
years, he constructed a cohesive monolith, with himself as president of the republic
and president of the party. His monolithic power is documented by Human Rights
Watch as follows:36
“As the head of the army, Habyarimana had the allegiance of some 7,000
troops of the Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces Armées Rwandaises-FAR),
about 1,200 of whom were part of the National Police (Gendarmarie). He
was loyally supported especially by the elite units, made up largely of men
from his home region: the Presidential Guard, estimated at between 1,000
and 1,300 troops, the paracommandos and the reconnaissance troops... He
also enjoyed active support from heads of the parastatal corporations that
controlled public services like gas, water and electricity, or bus transport,  as
well as intellectual elite... He benefited enormously from the support of the
hierarchy of the Catholic Church, which constituted 62 per cent of
Rwandans among its adherents... One more link strengthened the
connections from top to bottom of this highly structured system was the
“akazu” or “little house” which refers to a special circle within the larger
network of personal connections that worked to support Habyarimana. It
was composed mostly of the people of Habyarimana’s home region, with
Madame Habyarimana and her relatives playing a major role.”
Habyarimana formed a system of “intensive administration”. Rwanda was
divided into eleven prefectures. Below them were communes and sectors. The aim of
this intensive administration was control and mobilization. The control was
implemented by a high ratio of officials to ordinary people and by regulations
governing population registration and movement. The Habyarimana government
required people moving from one location to another to register with the local
authorities.37
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Habyarimana also put in place a system of “regional and ethnic equilibrium”,
in other words “ethnic quotas” for jobs and educational opportunities.38 According to
this policy, “each sector of the population was to receive a share of jobs, school
placements, directorships and so forth, according to its proportion of the population”,
and according to that policy “allotted portion” of the Tutsi was 9 per cent (but, Tutsi
were never given their full allotted portion).39
Despite the increasing polarization of Hutus, Tutsis and Twas, there was a
relative stalemate until the late 1980s; Habyarimana regime enjoyed a favored image
among Western governments and donors.40 With such help, the government
constructed an impressive infrastructure, particularly roads and telephone and
electric service. For the first decade, the economy did better than others in the same
region, with a net increase in gross national product.41
But, the Rwandan economy was more vulnerable than it seemed. It was weak
because of its “monoculture” character dependent on world coffee prices. The fact
that, “high population growth rate assured that any economic growth would be
rapidly absorbed by additional mouths to feed” added to the problem.42 In 1983,
coffee prices dropped sharply on the international market, and this, along with
massive devaluation, dramatically worsened Rwanda’s debt. Furthermore, the return
of a number of refugees from Uganda and Burundi increased the pressure on local
resources and land. Rwanda’s gross domestic product (GDP) declined by 30 per cent
and production by 33 per cent between 1990 and 1993.43 Because of increasing
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corruption and favoritism on the part of the Habyarimana and his inner circle,
political leaders, intellectuals and journalists began demanding reforms.
In the face of these social and economic difficulties, Habyarimana regime
resorted to anti-Tutsi propaganda, as Kayibanda did, to maintain his authoritarian
grip.44 And, “the RPF attack” gave him the chance to reanimate popular resentment
against Tutsi through such propaganda. As Weiss puts it: “Whatever the value of
arguments about ethnic differences, they were effective tools of political struggle for
control of resources and power.”45 Vaccaro explains the role of anti-Tutsi
propaganda, which boosts “ethnic hatred” as follows:
“During the Hutu revolt and the period of Hutu rule, the Tutsi were blamed for
almost all problems the country faced. Such scapegoating flared into ethnic
massacres from time to time: notable incidents occurred in 1963, 1966, 1973,
and 1990 through 1993. With each spate of violence more Tutsi flared Rwanda.
In 1992, ...about half of the Tutsi population was in exile...”46
II.b. Evolution of the Crisis:
When the above-mentioned economic and social problems coincided with
political manipulation and propaganda inciting social polarization and ethnic hatred,
the situation in Rwanda turned to a humanitarian crisis, then genocide. The RPF
attack firing a civil war and the assassination of the Rwandan President Habyarimana
starting the genocide were turning points in the evolution of the crisis.
II.b.1. The RPF Attack:
Tutsi exiles who sought refuge in Uganda after the Hutu overthrew the Tutsi
rule following independence, formed a revolutionary group called the Rwandan
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Alliance for National Unity in 1979.47 In 1986, its name was changed to the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Its demands included the return of all Rwandan
refugees and the formation of a government that would promote ethnic
reconciliation.48 The group also consisted of some Hutus who opposed the ruling
party in Rwanda, and some moderate Hutus.
The militarization of the RPF was accelerated by events during the civil war
in Uganda; RPF had joined forces with Yoweri Musevini in his fight to overthrow
the Ugandan dictator Milton Obote. It learned guerilla tactics and gained military
experience as well as Musevini’s support.49 In 1990, 4.000 Tutsi who were serving in
the army of Uganda formed the Rwandan Patriotic Army as a military wing of the
RPF. Together with 3.000 other exiles, they invaded Rwanda on 1 October 1990.50
This attack had a two-fold impact. One the one hand, the Habyarimana
government, which was close to collapse, found the opportunity to rebuilt his eroding
base of power. After the initial RPF success, France, Belgium and Zaire sent military
aid and troops to assist the Habyarimana government.51 With the help of the foreign
troops, Rwandan soldiers drove the RPF back towards the Ugandan border. As a
result of the crisis, the great majority of the opponents came to the support of the
government, against the “inyenzi”, the “enemy”.52 By accusing the Tutsi inside the
country, of being “accomplices” (ibyitso) of the invaders, he reverted to the tactics of
the 1960s. But this time, definition of “ibyitso” also included Hutu opponents.53
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On the other hand, knowing of RPF pressure on the regime, its opponents
were encouraged to demand more rapid changes.54 The Rwandan human rights
movement established various organizations like the Rwandan Association for the
Defense of Human Rights and Public Liberties. These organizations quickly began
insisting on reforms necessary to permit full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
Opponents began to organize opposition parties.55 The International Monetary Fund,
the World Bank and donor nations, too, urged Habyarimana to do democratic
reforms and find a solution to the problems.56 All these pressures made him obliged
to accept the constitutional amendment that made multiple political parties legal.
Opponent parties:57 the Democratic Republican Movement (Mouvement
Démocratique Républicain, MDR), Social Democratic Party (Parti Social Démocrate,
PSD), Liberal Party (Parti Libéral, PL) and the Democratic Christian Party (Parti
Démocrate Chrétien, PDC) were formed.
Habyarimana enacted a series of power-sharing agreements and agreed to
incorporate the major opposition parties in a coalition government, which took office
in April 1992.58 The five-party government did not include the RPF, but it signed a
series of cease-fires with the RPF, none of which lasted long.59 The first was signed
on 26 October 1990 in Gbadolite, Zaire, another cease-fire agreement was signed on
29 March 1991 in N’sele, Zaire, but repeated violations caused it to be amended on
16 September 1991 at a meeting in Gbadolite and again in 12 July 1992 at a meeting
in Arusha.60
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The final agreement, which was reached with the assistance of international
mediation sponsored by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), outlined the
creation of a buffer zone between the RPF-held territory and the rest of Rwanda, and
the establishment of a peacekeeping observer mission.61 At the request of both the
Rwandan government and the RPF, the OAU established the Neutral Military
Observer Group (NMOG, later termed NMOG-I) in July 1992 to observe and verify
the compliance with the cease-fire agreement. NMOG consisted of forty military
officers, ten each from Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and Zimbabwe plus five officers each
from the FAR (Rwandan Government Army) and RPF.62 The OAU observers were
stationed in northern Rwanda along the cease-fire line between the rival armies.
This change in Habyarimana’s position caused resentment among extremist
Hutus in the government. And this resentment strengthened extremist Hutu groups,
the most serious being the Coalition pour la Defence de la Republique (CDR) and
eventually the “akazu” (little house).63 By 1992, the MRND (Habyarimana’s party)
and the CDR had each formed its own armed militia. The MRND’s was known as
the “interahamwe” (those who work together), and the CDR’s was known as
“impuzamugambi” (those with a single purpose).64 The opposition parties, too,
organized their youth wings, which increasingly engaged in violence against rivals.
But, these were not so strong as the militia of MRND and CDR. Because, the latter
were more numerous and better organized than the youth of other parties.65 Besides
they received military training from regular soldiers beginning in 1992. This
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militarization and the “kubohoza” (to help liberate); the fact that violence was
accepted as a “normal” attitude in the pursuit of political ends, set the scene for
genocide.66
II.b.2 Beginning of the UN Involvement:
On 8 February, the RPF initiated an incursion into the buffer zone established
by the 12 July agreement. Following the attack, both the government of Rwanda and
the government of Uganda wrote separately to the President of the Security Council
on 22 February and requested the United Nations deploy an observer mission along
their 150 kilometer common border.67 The government of Uganda aimed at
forestalling any spread of the military conflict within Rwanda into the territory of
Uganda, as well as forestalling any accusations against Uganda of supporting RPF.68
In its letter, the Government of Rwanda called for observers to be deployed
specifically to prevent any military assistance to the RPF from Ugandan territory.69
In response, the Secretary General dispatched a technical mission to Rwanda
and Uganda. As the UN mission was gathering facts, the Rwanda government and
the RPF met in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and agreed to reinstate the cease-fire
beginning 9 March. Peace talks resumed on 16 March in Arusha and continued into
June.70 The Security Council in its resolution 812 (1993) of 12 March, welcomed this
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development and called upon the two sides to respect the cease-fire and to allow the
delivery of humanitarian supplies.71 The technical mission reported that it would be
possible to deploy UN military observers to monitor the border between Rwanda and
Uganda. But, the RPF, which controlled about four-fifths of the border, informed the
mission that it was “opposed to the deployment of the observers on the Rwandan side
of the border, but did not object to a deployment on Ugandan territory”, therefore,
military observers had to be deployed on the Ugandan side of the border.72
On 22 June 1993, the Security Council, by its resolution 846 (1993),
authorized the establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-
Rwanda (UNOMUR) on the Uganda side of the common border, for an initial period
of six months, subject to review every six months.
II.b.3. Arusha Peace Agreement:
The peace process was not smooth; the MRND and CDR supporters killed
dozens of Tutsi and members of opposition parties in the Kibuye massacre, and, a
military memorandum defining the “enemy” was disseminated by the high command
of the Rwandan Army.73 The Memorandum divided the “enemy” into two categories:
the principal enemy was “the Tutsi inside or outside the country, extremist and
nostalgic for power, who have never recognized and will never recognize the realities
of the 1959 Revolution and who wish to reconquer power by all means necessary,
including arms”.74 Partisans of the “enemy”-moderate Hutus and Hutus dissatisfied
with the regime in power- were the second category.75 The MRND and CDR
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mobilized their followers in the streets to protest the agreement and disrupt the peace
process. In spite of these negative developments, pressure from international
community resulted in the signing of Arusha Peace Agreement.76 On 4 August 1993,
General Habyarimana and Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe, chairman of the RPF signed
a comprehensive peace accord in Arusha, Tanzania.
The Arusha Peace Accord entailed the creation of a transitional government
in which 5 of 22 ministers would be allocated to the RPF; the establishment of a
commission to oversee the return of refugees to Rwanda and ensure their security;
the formation of an integrated army with 50 per cent of the high command and 40 per
cent of the troops coming from the RPF and the remainder from the FAR (Rwandan
Government Forces); and the organization of new parliamentary elections in 1995.
Furthermore the accords included a request for a Neutral International Force (NIF) to
facilitate the implementation of the agreement. A timetable indicating when each of
the prescribed reforms was to take place was written into the accord.77 The
agreement also provided for the integration of NMOG into the new international
monitoring force. In early August 1993, NMOG I was replaced by an expanded
NMOG II force composed of some 130 personnel to operate as an interim measure
pending the deployment of the neutral international force.78
The Arusha agreement called upon the UN to play a major support role
during the 22-month transitional period, beginning with the installation of a broad-
based transitional government and ending with the holding of national elections.79
UN sent a reconnaissance mission to Rwanda on 19 August 1993, and on the basis of
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mission’s findings the Secretary General recommended the Security Council the
establishment of a United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), with
the mandate of “contributing to the establishment and maintenance of a climate
conducive to the secure installation and subsequent operation of the transitional
government”.80 UNAMIR was established on 5 October by Security Council
resolution 872 (1993) for an initial period of six months. The Council then
authorized the Secretary General to deploy the first contingent to Kigali.81
This agreement offered a prospect for peace, but it also encountered strong
opposition from Hutu extremists who feared an end to their privileged status in
Rwandan society. “Therefore”, Murphy argues, “the peace process was orphaned
from the outset”.82 Vaccaro, mentions “weak political support for reconciliation
within Rwanda” as one of the main reasons for the failure of the peace process.83 He
states that,
“only the RPF and its supporters wanted to implement the original Arusha
Peace Agreement, which was designed to bring the RPF into the
government....The second group key to events in Rwanda consists of
extremists within the ruling clique who wanted to stay in power despite the
accords....Clearly, the extremist groups were working against the peace
process”. 84
As a result, the transitional government called for in the accord was never
established, Implementation of the accord had faltered badly by late March. Tensions
were increased by the use of hate radio by Hutu extremists. Just after the accord was
signed the CDR party instituted a propaganda campaign.85 Progress to peace was
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“one step forward and two steps back”.86 The turning point was the assassination of
President Habyarimana in April 1994. It was the beginning of genocide.
On 6 April 1994, Rwanda’s “moderate” Hutu president, Habyarimana was
killed in a plane crash outside the Rwandan capital, Kigali.87 His plane was hit by
two missiles fired from the military camp at Kanombe, which was controlled by the
Presidential Guard.88 Efforts by UNAMIR to reach the crash site were blocked.89
Hutus claimed that Tutsi rebels shot down the plane, but, the evidences show that
extremist Hutus shot down the plane due to their “disdain for the moderate
Habyarimana’s efforts to reconcile with the Tutsi”.90 In the hours immediately
following the crash, opposition Hutu politicians and ethnic Tutsi were slaughtered by
government troops, Presidential Guards, and armed militias.91 Therefore, according
to many observers, this was “a part of a strategy by extremist Hutu officials to end
the peace process and consolidate power in their own hands”.92
 II.b.4. Propaganda  and Genocide:
As mentioned above, anti-Tutsi propaganda has always played an important
role in social and political developments in Rwanda. It also hampered the
implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement. Just after the agreement was signed
the CDR party instituted a propaganda campaign, which opposed it and advocated
violence against those supporting reconciliation. It became increasingly virulent and
increased the tensions. In addition to party meetings which offer great opportunity to
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spread “hate propaganda”, media emerged as the most effective way of
disseminating the anti-Tutsi propaganda. Propagandists developed the same themes
over and over, both before and during the genocide.
The newspaper Kangura, one of the most effective voice of violence, began
spewing forth attacks on the RPF and on Tutsi immediately after the October 1990
invasion.93 Kangura assured the Hutu, “you are an important ethnic group of
Bantu...The nation is artificial but the ethnic group is natural”.94 It stressed that
“Tutsi were foreign to the area and had stolen Rwanda from its rightful inhabitants.
The ruthless conquerors had ground the Hutu under their heel in a repressive and
bloody regime...but, when the great mass had become conscious of its own strength
and had come together, it had been able to overthrow the “feudal” oppressors in the
great revolution of 1959”.95
The Radio was more effective in delivering the message of hate directly and
simultaneously to a wide audience. Radio Rwanda was very much the voice of the
government and of the president himself. And, in 1992, it warned that Hutu leaders
in Bugesera were going to be murdered by Tutsi, false information meant to spur the
Hutu massacres of Tutsi.
Hutu hard-liners created their own station; Radio Télévision Libre des Mille
Collines (RTLM) in April 1993. Their main theme was “fight to defend the
Republic”. It warned the Hutu against “infiltrators” who were said to be coming to
kill Hutu and replayed all the familiar messages of hate: “the inherent differences
between Hutu and Tutsi, the numerical superiority of the Hutu-the rubanda
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nyamwinshi, the majority people- the cleverness of the Tutsi infiltration, their
cruelty, their cohesiveness, their intention to restore past repression, the risk they
posed to the gains of the 1959 revolution, and above all, their plan to exterminate the
Hutu”. One RTLM announcer promised that a “shining day” would dawn when there
would be not a single “inyenzi”96 left in the country, and such messages concluded
with calls to “action”. Throughout the genocide Radio Rwanda and RTLM continued
to broadcast both incitements to slaughter and the directions on how to carry it out.
By the end of the 1993, RTLM was regularly naming individuals “who deserve to
die”.
 A UN Commission on Human Rights investigator concluded that
government propaganda had created a situation in which “all Tutsi inside the country
were collectively labeled accomplices with the RPF...There is a certain elite which,
in order to cling to power, is continuing to fuel ethnic hatred....Such outbreaks were
planned and prepared, with targets being identified in speeches by representatives of
the authorities, broadcasts on Rwandan radio, and leaflets.”97
  David Matas, in his article “Lessons from Rwanda”, emphasized the
importance of propaganda; hate speech, and examines the Rwanda case from a very
different perspective. He argues that “the Rwanda genocide...had its origins in hate
speech,...and, because of Rwanda, the world can no longer ignore the obligation to
prohibit hate speech....One reason for the absence of effective international
enforcement is the absence of effective anti-hate speech laws almost everywhere.” 98
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In short, genocide in Rwanda shows the role of propaganda through media in
the politicization of ethnic identities, and describes how media can be used by ethnic
manipulators to stir up ethnic fears and hatreds among the population concerned. As
this chapter puts forth, political manipulation, social polarization, poverty and over
population were the problems setting the scene for genocide. Propaganda can be seen
as a “catalyst” transforming these problems into genocide.
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CHAPTER III
THE UN INVOLVEMENT IN THE RWANDA CRISIS
The aim of this chapter is to examine the UN involvement in Rwanda: UN
operations UNOMUR, UNAMIR-I, UNAMIR-II, French Operation Turquoise, US
Operation Support Hope and other unilateral support operations, Human Rights Field
Operation (HRFOR) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The
analysis of the operations covers the UN Resolutions and other decisions, legal bases
of the resolutions, mandates and rules of engagement of the operations, composition,
deployment, and financing of the forces, and evaluation of their performance.
        III.a. United Nations Observer Mission in Uganda-Rwanda
(UNOMUR):
As mentioned above, the Security Council adopted resolution 846 on 22 June
1993, establishing the UNOMUR, to be deployed on the Uganda side of the common
border.1 According to the resolution, UNOMUR was to monitor the border to verify
that no military assistance reached Rwanda, with the focus being placed on the
transit or transport, by road or track, of any lethal weapons and ammunition across
border.2
                                                          
1 “Security Council Resolution establishing the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
(UNOMUR), to be deployed on the Ugandan side of the Uganda-Rwanda border for an initial period
of six months”, The UN, The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996, Blue Book Series, Volume X,
New York: Department of Public Information, 1996, pp. 167-168.
2 ibid., SC Resolution 846, paragraph 3.
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The resolution emphasized the need “to prevent the resumption of fighting,
which could have adverse consequences on the situation in Rwanda and on
international peace and security”, and the need for “a negotiated political solution, in
the framework of the agreements to be signed by the parties in Arusha, in order to
put an end to the conflict in Rwanda”.3
On 29 June, the Secretary General informed the Council of his intention to
appoint Brigadier-General Romeo A. Dallaire as Chief Military observer of
UNOMUR.4 Following the conclusion of a status-of-mission agreement with the
government of Uganda on 16 August deployment of the force began. By the end of
September UNOMUR had been fully deployed and reached its authorized strength.
The mission was composed of 81 military observers from the following countries:
Bangladesh (22), Bostwana (9), Brazil (13), Hungary (4), Netherlands (9), Senegal
(10), Slovakia (5) and Zimbabwe (9).5 In addition, 16 international and 6 locally
recruited civilian staff provided administrative support to the mission.6 UNOMUR
established its headquarters in Kabale, Uganda, about 20 kilometers north of the
border with Rwanda.7
The Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, as requested by the resolution
846, reported on the implementation and contributions of UNOMUR. In his second
report, evaluating UNOMUR’s performance during the period from 22 October to 15
December 1993, he noted that “UNOMUR’s activities consisting of surveillance,
patrolling and investigations have been effective both as a deterrent and as
                                                          
3 ibid.
4 The UN, The Blue Helmets, A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, Third Edition, New York:
UN Department of Public Information, p. 342.
5 The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996, p. 234.
6 ibid.
7 The Blue Helmets, p. 342.
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interdiction....UNOMUR has been a factor of stability in the area by playing a useful
role as a confidence-building mechanism.”8
The report also revealed that “the total cost of UNOMUR for the period 22
June to 21 December 1993, including pre-implementation costs, have been estimated
at $ 4.392.900 gross ($ 4.308.000 net)”.9 Boutros-Ghali recommended the costs of
UNOMUR be considered as an expense of the organization to be borne by member
states in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter and the assessment
be credited to a special account for that purpose.10
UNOMUR established observation posts at two major crossing sites and three
secondary sides on the Ugandan side of the border. The mission monitored the area
through mobile patrols enhanced by airborne coverage.11 It also facilitated the transit
of the vehicles transporting food and medical supplies to Rwanda. The Secretary
General noted in his above-mentioned report that “...as a result of UNOMUR’s
efforts, clandestine cross-border traffic has decreased. There is now...no evidence of
any significant traffic in armaments”.12
When UNAMIR was established with SC resolution 872, UNOMUR came
under the command of the new mission. On 20 December the Security Council
passed resolution 891 and extended UNOMUR’s mandate by six months. The
resolution 891 stated that UNOMUR’s integration within UNAMIR would be purely
administrative in nature and would in no way affect the mission mandate as set out in
                                                          
8 The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996, pp. 234-235, see Map 2, infra., p. 147, (resource: The UN and
Rwanda 1993-96, p. 30).
9 The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996, pp. 234-235.
10 The Blue Helmets, p. 374.
11 ibid., p. 345.
12 The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996, p. 234.
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resolution 846.13 With the resolution 891, the Council expressed its appreciation to
the government of Uganda for its cooperation and support for UNOMUR and also
underlined the importance of a cooperative attitude on the part of the civilian and
military authorities in the mission area.14
III.b.  United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR):
According to the Arusha Peace Agreement, the United Nations should play its
part through what the agreement termed the Neutral International Force (NIF). The
NIF was to assist in the implementation of the agreement, guarantee the overall
security of the country and verify the maintenance of law and order, and ensure the
security of the delivery of humanitarian assistance.15
The timetable of the Agreement proceeded from the assumption that the NIF
could be deployed in about a month, but this was unrealistic. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
informed the parties that even if the Council were to approve such a force, it would
take at least 2-3 months for it to be deployed. He also mentioned the enormous
demands being made of the United Nations for troops, in particular in Somalia and
Bosnia, and that the United Nations was going through a financial crisis.16
The UN report on human rights situation in Rwanda, describing the visit by
the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Wally Bacre Ndiaye,
gave a serious picture. In the report he indicated that “the victims of the attacks,
Tutsis in the overwhelming majority of the cases, have been targeted solely because
                                                          
13 ibid., p. 235, see Map 3, infra., p. 148, (resource: The Blue Helmets, p. 349).
14 ibid., p. 234.
15 The Independent Inquiry, “Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations
During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda”, 15 December 1999,
http://www.un.org/News/ossg/rwanda_report.htm, p. 3 of 17.
16 ibid., p. 4.
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of their membership to a certain ethnic group and for no other objective reason”.17
Citing the 1948 Genocide Convention, he discussed that the term “genocide” might
be applicable.
Considering the report from the reconnaissance mission, Boutros Boutros-
Ghali presented a report to the Security Council on the establishment of a
peacekeeping operation in Rwanda on 24 September 1993.18 In his report, he made
recommendations on the mission mandate; he proposed that the mission (UNAMIR)
assist in arms recovery and verification through checkpoints and patrol. On 5
October, the Council adopted resolution 872, which established UNAMIR, but
decided on a more limited mandate.19
According to the resolution 872, the mission mandate included the following
elements:20
(a) To contribute to the security of the city of Kigali, inter alia, within a
weapons-secure area established by the parties in and around the city,
(b) To monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement, which calls for the
establishment of cantonment and assembly zones and the demarcation of
the new and demilitarized zone and other demilitarization procedures,
(c) To monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional
government’s mandate, leading up to the elections,
(d) To assist with mine clearance, primarily through training programs,
                                                          
17 ibid., p. 3.
18 The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996, (S/26488), p. 221.
19 The Independent Inquiry, p. 5.
20 The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996, p. 232.
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(e) To investigate, at the request of the parties, or on its own initiative,
instances of non-compliance with the provisions of the agreement, on
integration of the armed forces of the two parties, and pursue any such
instances with the parties responsible and report thereon as appropriate to
the Secretary General,
(f) To monitor the process of repatriation of refugees and the resettlement of
displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly
manner,
(g) To assist in the co-ordination of humanitarian assistance in conjunction
with relief operations, and,
(h) To investigate and report on incidents regarding activities of the
gendarmerie and police.
Boutros-Ghali’s suggestion that UNAMIR assist in the recovery of arms did not
appear in the resolution.
UNAMIR was to be conducted at the behest of the former belligerents and
had their formal consent. Authorized as a consensual operation, the use of force was
limited to self-defense.21 It was a traditional peacekeeping mission, thus its rules of
engagement were too defined in a restricted manner. General Dallaire sent a draft set
of rules of engagement for UNAMIR, including a rule specifically allowing the
                                                          
21 J. Matthew Vaccaro, “The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Disaster Relief in Rwanda”, in
William J. Durch (ed.), UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s,
London: Macmillan Press,  p. 376.
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mission to act, and even to use force, in response to crimes against humanity and
other abuses.22 But, this was not accepted either.
UNAMIR was to be a phased operation; both in tasks assigned to the UN
forces and consequently in the size of the force deployed. The operation would be
conducted in four phases:23 During phase one, which was scheduled to last
approximately three months, the installation and operation of the broad-based
government was to begin.24 UNAMIR’s objective was to establish conditions for the
secure installation for such a government. To that end, phase one provided for the
immediate deployment of an advance party of approximately 25 military and 18
civilian personnel and 3 civilian police.25 By the completion of phase one, the force
strength would be 1,428, including 211 observers.
During phase two, which was supposed to last 90 days or until the process of
disengagement, demobilization and integration of the armed forces and gendarmerie
began, the operation was to have reached its peak manpower; 2,548 military
personnel.26 UNAMIR would continue to monitor the demilitarized zone, to assist in
providing security in and around Kigali and to ensure that all preparations for
disengagement, demobilization and integration were in place. UNOMUR and
NMOG II would be fully integrated into the mission in this phase.27
                                                          
22  The Independent Inquiry, p. 5, see Dallaire’s proposal on UNAMIR’s ROE, Scott R. Feil,
“Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda”, A Report to
the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1998, p.
7, http://www.ccpdc.org/pubs/rwanda/rwanda.htm.
23 Vaccaro, p. 380, see table… “Key Elements of UNAMIR’s Phased Concept of Operations”.
24 Donald C. F. Daniel, Bradd C. Hayes and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Coercive Inducement and the
Containment of International Crises, Washington DC.: US Institute of Peace Press, 1999, p. 118.
25 The UN and Rwanda, p. 25.
26 The Blue Helmets, p. 343.
27 The UN and Rwanda, p. 25.
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During phase three, which would last about nine months, the disengagement,
demobilization and integration of the forces would be completed and the mission
would reduce its staff to approximately 1,240 personnel.28
During the final phase, which would last about four months, UNAMIR would
assist in ensuring the secure atmosphere required in the final stages of the transitional
period leading up to the elections.29 Force strength would continue to be reduced, to
approximately 930 military personnel, of which 850 would be staff officers and
troops and 80 military observers.30
UNAMIR was organized as a traditional peacekeeping force, designed to help
implement peace accords. Jacques Roger Booh-Booh from Cameroon, was appointed
as a special representative of the Secretary General, and given overall authority.
Under him were three subordinate commands for the military units, the military
observers and the civilian police. General Dallaire, with his experience in the region
from UNOMUR, was named force commander. UNAMIR was authorized up to
2,548 military personnel in three infantry battalions, one engineer company, a
transportation section (with four utility helicopters), one logistics company, one
medical platoon, and 331 military observers. The civilian police component
(CIVPOL) was to be 60 personnel.31 The operation would be financed by the UN
member states according to the standard peacekeeping scale of assessment.
Dallaire arrived in Kigali on 22 December. The situation he found was tense.
By the end of December 1993 UNAMIR forces had effectively completed all phase
one tasks, but no transitional government was in place. Because, political parties,
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especially Habyarimana’s party MRND, and CDR could not agree on the relevant
modalities (power-sharing arrangements) of transitional government.32 They had
agreed in Arusha to set up the transitional government and the transitional national
assembly before 31 December 1993, but this targeted date passed without results.
On 5 January 1994 Habyarimana was sworn in as the interim president of the
transitional government. The following day the Security Council passed Resolution
893 strongly urging all parties to cooperate and fully comply with the Arusha
Agreement.33 Instability was increasing and delays in the implementation of the
peace agreement were contributing to a deterioration in the security situation.
UNAMIR’s reports from this period were providing graphic descriptions of the
killings.34
On 11 January 1994, Dallaire sent the Military Adviser  to the Secretary
General, Maurice Baril, a telegram entitled “Request for Protection for Informant”.35
According to the cable, an informant, who was formerly in the security staff of
President Habyarimana, had provided details of a plan by the Interahamwe to
precipitate a crisis that would cause the withdrawal of the UN force, especially of the
Belgian soldiers, and initiate a slaughter. The informant had been told to compile
lists of Tutsis in Kigali and feared it was for “extermination”. Furthermore, he said
that the Interahamwe had trained 1,700 men in the camps of RGF and was able to kill
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up to 1,000 Tutsi in 20 minutes. Thirdly, the informant told of a major weapons
cache with at least 135 weapons (G 3 and AK 47).36
The now famous “11 January Cable” is important, because it has come to
figure prominently in the discussions about what knowledge was available to the
United Nations about the risk of genocide.37 Having described the information
received from the informant, Dallaire urged UN headquarters to take action,
specifically by raiding arms caches that were being built up by Interahamwe in
Kigali, in violation of the Arusha Agreement requiring to keep the city a weapons-
free zone. The response from New York was a fax signed by Assistant Secretary
General Iqbal Rıza, in the name of the then Under Secretary General for
Peacekeeping Operations, Kofi Annan.38 General Dallaire was told not to take the
action he had proposed,39 but to inform President Habyarimana  and the ambassadors
in Kigali of Belgium, France and the United States. He did as he was told, and
informed the Secretariat that the President appeared alarmed by the tone of the
demarche. The President denied knowledge of the activities of the militia and had
promised to investigate.40
UNAMIR’s concerns with regard to the distribution of arms, the activities of
the militia, killings and increased ethnic tension continued throughout the early
months of 1994.41 Dallaire continuously informed the headquarters that the defensive
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concentration posture of UNAMIR threatened the security situation, and emphasized
the need to take a more active role in deterrent operations. But, every time he
requested permission to mount a military operation to seize suspected arms caches,
UN headquarters refused to grant it, and noted that such a mission went beyond
UNAMIR’s authorized mandate.42 Meanwhile, there had been increasingly violent
demonstrations as well as an increase in roadblocks, assassinations of political
leaders and assaults on and murder of civilians.43
By late March 1994, UNAMIR’s operational capacity was nearing its peak
with troops numbering 2,539.44 Following countries were contributing troops to the
operation: Austria (15), Bangladesh (942), Belgium (440), Botswana (9), Brazil (13),
Canada (2), the Congo (26), Egypt (10), Fiji (1), Ghana (843), Hungary (4), Malawi
(5), Mali (10), the Netherlands (9), Nigeria (15), Poland (5), Romania (5), the
Russian Federation (15), Senegal (35), Slovakia (5), Togo (15), Tunisia (61),
Uruguay (25) and Zimbabwe (29).45
On 5 April 1994, the Security Council decided to extend conditionally the
UNAMIR’s  mandate until 29 July 1994 -less than four months- by unanimously
adopting Resolution 909 (1994).46 The Secretary General, in his report on UNAMIR
dated 30 March, had recommended extending UNAMIR’s mandate by six months.
But, key members of the Security Council, (especially the United States) were
reluctant to accept such a long mandate extension.47
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On 6 April, one day after the Security Council extended UNAMIR’s
mandate, President Habyarimana was killed in a plane crash. Though not entirely
proven, responsibility for the shoot down is widely attributed to Hutu extremists,
who planned the crisis and the resultant genocide to prevent any form of power
sharing with the Tutsi. Hutu militiamen manned roadblocks erected all around Kigali
within thirty minutes of the crash, where identity cards were checked and all Tutsi
separated and killed.48 Government troops, Presidential Guards, armed militias and
roving gangs went from house to house using prepared lists and maps to identify and
locate Tutsi victims. Militant Hutus also attacked moderate Hutus associated with the
Habyarimana government, using machetes, pangas (machete-like weapons) and
sharpened sticks. Majority of Tutsi began to flee their homes and sought refuge in
central gathering places, churches, schools, hospitals, stadiums and other accessible
spaces.49 Within forty-eight hours, France, Belgium, Italy and the United States
organized an evacuation of expatriates from Rwanda.50
Among the first to be killed were the Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyamana
and the President of the Supreme Court Joseph Kavaruganda, followed by other
opposition leaders, intellectuals, professors and businessmen. They had asked for
UNAMIR’s protection, but the mission could not protect them.51 That day,
incumbent Prime Minister Ms. Uwilingiyimana, and 10 Belgian peacekeepers
assigned to protect her were brutally murdered by FAR soldiers. According to
Dallaire’s report to headquarters, he called Iqbal Rıza to inform him that UNAMIR
might have to use force to save the Prime Minister.52 Rıza confirmed the rules of
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engagement (ROE) that UNAMIR was not to fire until fired upon.53 After the
killings of Belgian peacekeepers, Dallaire informed the Belgian Senate Commission
that “an armed operation to rescue the Belgians was not feasible because of the
shortcomings and lack of resources of UNAMIR”. He stated that “the UNAMIR was
a peacekeeping operation. It was not equipped, trained or staffed to conduct
intervention operations”.54
Many civilians, too, sought the protection of the UNAMIR troops. The Ecole
Technique Officielle (ETO) was one of these sites. It has also gained a symbolic
importance as an example of the failings of the UN mission. Report of the
Independent Inquiry describes the tragic events at ETO as follows:55
“About 2,000 people had sought refuge at ETO, believing that the UNAMIR
troops would be able to protect them. There were members of the Interahamwe
and Rwandan soldiers outside the school complex.  On 11 April, after the
expatriates in ETO had been evacuated by French troops, the Belgian
contingent at ETO left the school, leaving behind men, women and children,
many of whom were massacred by the waiting soldiers and militia.
These events show that when violence broke out in April 1994, UNAMIR
could not prevent the killing and contain the conflict. It could not conduct its
mandated tasks either. Because, the mission had been established as a peacekeeping
force under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. It possessed neither the mandate nor the
force to coerce the parties into ending the violence. It had no war stocks, little
ammunition, and except for the Belgian battalion, only poorly equipped forces.56
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On 12 April, the African Group at the United Nations urged the Security
Council to take urgent actions to protect the lives and property of the civilians in
Rwanda, and to consider expanding the size and mandate of UNAMIR.57
Furthermore, they emphasized the readiness of OAU to cooperate with the UN in
efforts to implement such a serious action. While the African Group was offering
further action, the government of Belgium decided, the same day, to withdraw its
contingent from UNAMIR, because of the fact that ten Belgian soldiers had been
killed.58 Belgium’s message, in its letter to the Council, was as follows:59
“It is obvious that under these conditions the continuation of the UNAMIR
operation has become pointless within the terms of its present mandate. The
Arusha peace plan is dead, and there are no means for a dialogue between
the parties. In any event, the continued presence of the Belgian contingent
would expose it to unacceptable risks.”
This decision greatly affected the mission. At that time, the Belgian
contingent, with its 400 soldiers, was the third largest among those of the 24
countries participating in UNAMIR.60 Thus it was the “backbone” of the operation
with “the only fully equipped and competent combat unit”.61 That is why, when the
government of Belgium declared its decision on withdrawal, the Secretary General
Boutros-Ghali asked Belgium leave their heavy weapons in Rwanda so they could be
used by other UNAMIR contingents. But, when the Belgian contingent left Rwanda,
it did so with all its weaponry.62 After Belgium’s withdrawal, UNAMIR had little
capability or mobility.
Throughout this period, UNAMIR continued attempts to secure a cease-fire
between FAR and RPF, but both sides adopted rigid positions, undermining
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UNAMIR’s efforts.63 UNAMIR headquarters were hit on 19 April.64  There were no
casualties, but Boutros-Ghali informed the Security Council that “UNAMIR
personnel could not be left at risk indefinitely with no possibility of performing the
tasks for which they were dispatched”.65 And, on 21 April, the government of
Bangladesh- which was providing the largest troop contingent to UNAMIR with over
900 soldiers stationed in Rwanda- sent a letter to the Security Council stating that the
Bangladeshi peacekeepers were being exposed to unnecessary risks.66 Bangladesh
reported that “the UNAMIR forces, already depleted by the withdrawal of the
Belgian troops, were short of even the necessary equipment, weapons and
ammunition to protect themselves, and were being drawn into cross-fire between
rival factions that threatened to compromise their neutrality as peacekeepers.”67
As a result of all these negative developments, it was necessary to decide how
the United Nations would maintain its efforts to help solve the crisis in Rwanda.
Boutros-Ghali presented the Security Council three scenarios.68 The first option
called for the immediate and massive reinforcement of UNAMIR and a change in its
mandate so that it would have the equipment and the authorization to coerce the
opposing forces into a cease-fire. This scenario would require several thousand
additional troops and that UNAMIR be given enforcement powers under Chapter VII
of the Charter.69
The second option called for a decrease in the mandate and troop numbers.
According to that option, UNAMIR personnel would be reduced to approximately
270. A small group headed by the UNAMIR force commander would remain in
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Kigali to act as an intermediary between the two sides in an attempt to bring about a
cease-fire.70
The third option was the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR. The Secretary
General told that the consequences of this option, in terms of human lives lost could
be very severe, so he did not recommend this option.71
During the discussions in the Security Council the United States initially
declared that “if a decision were to be taken then, it would only accept a withdrawal
of UNAMIR, as it believed there was no useful role for a peacekeeping operation
under the prevailing circumstances”.72 The United Kingdom and Russia supported
the second option, and in further consultations, the United States indicated it too
could accept this alternative.73 United Kingdom responded by stating that option one
was not feasible because of the lessons drawn from Somalia that “conditions on the
ground could evolve rapidly and dangerously”.74
Dallaire put forward the dilemma facing the UN under the scenarios being
discussed, as follows:75
“The consequences of a withdrawal by UNAMIR will definitely have an
adverse effect on the morale of the civil population, especially the refugees,
who feel that we are deserting them. However, in actual fact there is little that
we are doing at the present time,...the refugees at locations like Hotel Mille
Collines, St Michels Cathedral etc. Are in danger of massacre, but have been in
this danger...even with UNAMIR on the ground.”
Ghali’s Special Representative in Rwanda Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh
expressed full support for option one; the reinforcement of UNAMIR, but also said
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he did not have problems with amended option two. Meanwhile Boutros-Ghali was
trying to counter moves in the Security Council to withdraw UNAMIR.76
Finally, on 21 April the Council adopted resolution 912 and decided on the
second option. According to resolution 912, the UN would reduce UNAMIR to about
270 troops and change the missions mandate.77 UNAMIR would act as intermediary
in attempts to secure a cease-fire. The small force would assist with efforts to resume
humanitarian relief efforts, and would continue to monitor and report on the
changing situation.
Following the crash of the President’s plane and the subsequent genocide, the
civil war between the RPF and FAR had entered into a new and more violent
phase.78 On the second day after the crash, RPF launched an offensive from the
positions it occupied in Rwanda and attacked the “interim government”, which had
been set up on 8 April 1994 by elements of the former Rwandan government. The
“interim government” left Kigali as fighting with the RPF intensified, establishing
itself in Gitamara. By the end of May 1994, RPF had occupied about half of the
territory.
Another problem was refugee flows that created a humanitarian crisis of
unprecedented dimensions. UNHCR reported that on 29 April 1994, 250.000
Rwandan crossed into Tanzania over the previous 24 hours, marking the highest rate
of refugee exodus ever recorded in history.79
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III.c. UNAMIR II: 
The disastrous situation made Boutros-Ghali recommend a reversal of the
decision to reduce the force level.80 In his letter dated 29 April, he noted that “UN
has lost its credibility with the Rwandan parties” and that “only a forceful response
to restore law and order could regain it”.81 He also added, “such action would require
a commitment of human and material resources on a scale which member states so
far proved reluctant to contemplate”.82 This communication is also important for it
indicated that “most of the massacres have been perpetrated by armed groups of
civilians taking advantage of the complete breakdown of law and order in Rwanda”,
implying a greater chance of success for a UN intervention to stop the massacres.83
At first, Security Council remained reluctant to accept Boutros-Ghali’s call,
largely due to resistance by the United States. While African members were arguing
for a more robust UNAMIR force, the United States insisted on displacement or, an
incremental upgrading of the force. The US also rejected Secretariat’s
recommendation to create internal safe areas, and instead supported safe areas across
the borders of the neighboring countries.84 According to the US “despite the
Secretary-General’s efforts, no state had made a firm offer to send their forces to
Rwanda and the Rwandan factions had not given unconditional consent to the UN
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operation.”85 Therefore, a more detailed planning was necessary before going into
Kigali, since “the active fighting placed both UN forces and UN prestige at risk,
which in turn could jeopardize US funding for UN peacekeeping operations”.86 One
of the main reasons for the US position was its new peacekeeping policy PDD-25
(Presidential Decision Directive), which argued against intervention in areas and
countries outside of US strategic interest.
On 4 May, Boutros-Ghali publicly called the situation “genocide” and
warned, “if the UN did not act quickly, it might later be accused of passivity”.87 And,
after a lengthy debate the Security Council adopted resolution 918 (1994), on 17
May 1994 expanding UNAMIR’s mandate.88 The three-part resolution expressed
concern over “a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions”, but there was no
reference to genocide.  New Zealand failed in an attempt to include a reference to
genocide in the resolution. According to Weiss, the US and other members of the
international community realized that “such language would require stronger military
intervention based on the international agreement to act under the terms of the 1948
Genocide Convention”, and that was the reason for their reluctance to call it
“genocide”.89 Resolution 918 did not mention “genocide”, but the Security Council
determined, for the first time, that the situation in Rwanda constituted “a threat to
peace and security in the region”.
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As mentioned above, it was a three-part resolution. In part A, the Security
Council, acting under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, decided to expand the
UNAMIR’s mandate and to authorize an increase of its force level to 5.500.90 Under
the new mandate UNAMIR II was to contribute to the security and protection of
displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk (including the establishment and
maintenance of secure humanitarian areas), and to provide security and support for
the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations.91
In part B of the resolution, the Security Council invoked Chapter VII of the
UN Charter and placed an arms embargo on the delivery of arms, ammunition and
related material to Rwanda. The embargo also aimed at preventing the sale of
weapons to Rwandan nationals through the territory of other states. To monitor the
embargo and recommend appropriate measures in response to any violations, the
Council also decided to establish a committee, consisting of all the members of the
Council.92
Part C of the resolution, requested the Secretary General to submit a report on
the investigation of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in
Rwanda during the conflict.93
Secretary General defined the rules of engagement of the mission as
follows:94
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“UNAMIR II’s rules of engagement do not envisage enforcement action. The
Mission would depend primarily on deterrence to carry out its tasks. However,
UNAMIR II may be required to take action in self-defence against persons or
groups who threaten protected sites and populations and the means of delivery
and distribution of humanitarian relief.”
He interprets that Resolution 918 invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter to
impose an arms embargo, but the rules of engagement for the force did not include
enforcement action as provided by Chapter VII.95 Donald Daniel explains “although
Chapter VII was mentioned in the resolution, it only referred to enforcing an arms
embargo. Hence, UNAMIR II was to operate as a classical peacekeeping mission.”96
General Dallaire had submitted a draft ROE to the UN headquarters for approval.
Scott Feil says his proposal had envisioned that “the strategic directive for such a
force would be adopted under Chapter VII, rather than Chapter VI. [It would] permit
the force to take offensive action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent
continued genocidal killing”, implying there is a contradiction between the mission
mandate and its ROE 97
There seems to be a vagueness in the language of the Resolution 918,
establishing UNAMIR II and the definition of its rules of engagement. Resolution
918 explicitly referred to Chapter VII to impose an arms embargo, which constitutes
an enforcement measure, though a non-military one, under Article 41 of the UN
Charter. Here the confusion is about what “enforcement action” means. When the
ROE says “UNAMIR II’s rules of engagement do not envisage enforcement action”
it means that they do not include “use of armed force”. But Resolution 918 invoked
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Chapter VII by imposing an arms embargo.  Therefore “deterrence” can be
considered adequate for such a measure not involving the use of armed force. The
fact that UNAMIR II’s ROE did not include military enforcement does not
necessarily mean that there is a contradiction between the mission mandate defined
in Resolution 918 and its ROE. Reference to Chapter VII in a resolution establishing
a peacekeeping operation seems to have caused this confusion.
Resolution 918 was passed, but the deployment of UNAMIR II proved to be
difficult because of the problems in finding troop contributors. By the end of June,
only 354 troops and 124 military observers of the authorized 5.500 were volunteered
by member states and deployed to UNAMIR II.98 And those states that did offer to
provide troops did not possess the certain essential equipment.
The Secretary General Boutros-Ghali expressed the gravity of the problem as
follows:99
“It is a genocide which has been committed. More than 200.000 people have
been killed, and the international community is still discussing what ought
to be done. I have tried. I was in contact with different heads of state, and
begged them to send troops. I was in contact with many organizations and
tried my best to help them find a solution to the problem. Unfortunately, let
me say with great humility, I failed. It is a scandal. I am the first one to say
it and I am ready to repeat it”.
Vaccaro confirms the difficulties faced by during the establishment of
UNAMIR II,100
“Secretariat officials, and in many cases the Secretary General himself, had
approached over 50 countries with request for troops. Only one country,
Ethiopia, had offered to provide a ready unit (a motorized infantry
battalion). Other offers of infantry units came from Congo, Ghana, Malawi,
Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; however, each of these
countries required that the units be equipped by the UN. The Secretariat
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began to make arrangements to obtain the needed equipment but such an
endeavor required still more time.”
Boutros-Ghali in his letter to the Security Council dated 20 June 1994
anticipated that UNAMIR might not be in a position to undertake its new mandate
for another three months.101 Therefore, he supported the offer of the French
government to undertake, with Council’s authorization, “a French-commanded,
multinational operation to assure the security and protection of displaced persons and
civilians at risk in Rwanda”.102 Then came French intervention, Operation
Turquoise.103 By the time UNAMIR II was ready to operate, most of the killing had
ended and the RPF had defeated the interim government.104
When it fully deployed in November 1994 UNAMIR II had 5.257 military
troops, 333 military observers, and 55 civilian police.105 The military units were
contributed by 15 different countries and included six infantry battalions (one each
from Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Tunisia, and Zambia) and an inter-African battalion
composed of troops from Chad, the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Niger and Senegal.106
Three separate infantry companies were contributed by Mali, Malawi, and Nigeria.
The command and control arrangements remained the same as for UNAMIR I,
except that a new force commander, Major General Guy Toussignant from the
Canadian army, replaced General Dallaire on 19 August 1994.107
UNAMIR II’s primary task in the reconciliation process was to maintain a
relatively secure environment.108 In addition to protecting population at risk,
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UNAMIR II transported refugees, collected arms surrendered by the gendarmerie,
and occasionally dispatched teams to investigate genocide sites.109 The major
difficulty it faced was the fact that it was viewed suspiciously by the new
government, which believed “the United Nations was still there to help bring the
deposed government back into power”.110 To improve its image, explain its
objectives, counter Hutu propaganda and encourage repatriation UNAMIR II
deployed an FM broadcasting capability.111
UNAMIR II also provided support to the human rights field operation
(HRFOR) operated under the auspices of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights.112 It conducted training for gendarmes and police instructors, run
infrastructure rebuilding and provided medical assistance.113
On 30 November 1994 Security Council passed Resolution 965, expanding
the mission’s mandate.114 Since the government could not ensure the safety of the
international personnel, it gave the responsibility to UNAMIR II to “contribute to the
security of human rights officers and the International Tribunal”.115
Despite UNAMIR II’s efforts, the security situation remained volatile through
the end of the year, especially along the borders where refugee camps were being
used to harbor militia members and store arms.116 The former members of the
extremist government and its military were playing an increasing role within the
camps; “they obliged refugees, through either the threat or actual use of force, to
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remain, and they often controlled the distribution of food and aid supplies within the
camps.”117 Their cross-border attacks caused the new government to increase
security measures, that in turn increased ethnic tensions.118
As violence became more frequent UNAMIR II forces made several raids on
camps to disarm and detain Hutu extremists.119 But these efforts did not work, and
the situation in refugee camps turned out an intricate dilemma for intervention
efforts. Weiss explained the dilemma as follows:120
“Of the 250.000 refugees, some 30.000 were among those who had planned,
initiated, or actively participated in the genocide. There were no outside
peacekeepers or other military forces to attempt to separate the refugees
from the perpetrators of genocide….Feeling increasingly unwilling to
become accomplices to the possibility of continued atrocities, several
agencies chose to withdraw-led by the ICRC and the MSF (Doctors Without
Borders), whose staff had originally been in the vanguard of the relief
effort.”
In addition to cross-border attacks which constituted an apparent threat of
renewed fighting and crisis in refugee camps, competing property claims, the
presence of 50-60.000 landmines and rehabilitation of the basic economy were other
major obstacles to the resumption of normal life.121 UNAMIR II tried to contribute
efforts to promote the return of refugees.
Despite these problems, the circumstances in Rwanda improved gradually
since the end of the war. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali requested a review of the
mandate and role of the UN, on 9 April 1995.122 His special representative discussed
with the Rwandan government a new mandate comprising tasks which “would shift
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the focus of UNAMIR II’s activities from peacekeeping to confidence-building”.123
But, the government made it clear that it would insist on a sharp reduction in the
scope of UNAMIR II’s tasks and its troop levels.124
 From January 1995 to April 1996, UNAMIR II was phased out.125 On 9 June
1995, its mandate was reduced, which led to a decrease in troops to 2.330 by 9
September and 1.800 by 9 October. On 1 December 1995, Boutros-Ghali recommend
the Security Council authorize a future UN presence in Rwanda.126 But, again the
Rwandan government declared that it would not agree to extension of UNAMIR II’s
mandate beyond 8 December.127 On 8 December, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1028 (1995), extending UNAMIR II’s  mandate until 12 December.128 On
that day, the council passed Resolution 1029 (1995), extending the mandate for a
final period until 8 March 1996 and reducing its strength to 1.200 troops and 200
military observers.129 Last elements of UNAMIR II left Rwanda on 19 April 1996.
Following termination of the UNAMIR II mandate, an agreement was reached
between the UN and the government of Rwanda on the setting up of the United
Nations Office in Rwanda (UNOR).130 UNOR aimed at enhancing “the ability of the
UN system as a whole to provide the support Rwanda needs for its efforts to solve
the grievous problems that still confront it”.131
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III.d. OPERATION TURQUOISE:
As mentioned above, the deployment of UNAMIR II proved to be a difficult
process because of the difficulties in finding troop contributors.132 As the deployment
delayed situation in Rwanda got worse. By July 1994 the fighting capacity of the
Rwandese Government Army (FAR) against the RPF had began to crumble. And, as
the RPF increased its military gains the Hutu population fled the areas coming under
RPF control.133 More than 2 million Rwandans flooded across the Zaire border, and
another 2.5 million were internally displaced.134 The RPF invasion of the northern
town of Ruhengeri on 13 July triggered the flight of 500.000 to 800.000 refugees to
Goma on 14-15 July.135 The lack of clean water and adequate sanitation in refugee
camps led to the rapid spread of diseases like cholera and dysentery among refugees.
Dehydration and exhaustion made the situation worse. By July 17, it was estimated
that one refugee was dying per minute due to disease, dehydration and exposure.136
Citing the deteriorating situation and the delay in the deployment of
UNAMIR II, France declared that it would deploy troops in Rwanda to assure the
security and the protection of displaced persons and civilians at risk in Rwanda. On
15 June, French Prime Minister Alain Juppé announced that France was prepared,
“along with its main European and African partners” to intervene in Rwanda “to
protect groups threatened with extinction”.137 In a 19 June letter to the President of
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the Security Council, the Secretary General Boutros-Ghali supported that proposal.138
On 20 June, the French government officially informed the Security Council that
France and Senegal were prepared to send a force into Rwanda. In its letter, France
requested “adoption of a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as a legal
framework for the deployment of a multilateral force to maintain a presence in
Rwanda until the expanded UNAMIR is deployed”.139
 France initially insisted that it would not act alone, but it soon became
apparent that none of its allies intended to join in the intervention. Murphy explains
the position of these “allies” as follows:140
“The WEU met, and while some members offered to provide equipment for
the intervention, none offered to provide troops. The US supported the idea
as a means of bridging the gap before arrival of the 5.500 planned UN
peacekeepers, but also declined to provide its own forces for the
intervention. Three of Rwanda’s neighbors-Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda-
denied France permission to stage operations from their territory.”
As the Security Council considered the draft French resolution, the RPF
expressed its opposition by declaring that “we consider the French to be a hostile
force that we will combat by all means”.141 Because they assumed, the intervention
an attempt “to protect the extremist Hutu regime and its supporters”.142 According to
Murphy, “the deceased President Habyarimana was reportedly a close personal
friend of France’s President Mitterrand; even the plane carrying Habyarimana that
was shot down was a gift to him from France”.143
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The Organization of African Unity (OAU) opposed to intervention, on the
basis that one of the conflict’s principal combatants, the RPF, was understandably
opposed it.144 Facing this skepticism, France asserted that
“The goal of the French initiative is exclusively humanitarian: the initiative
is motivated by the plight of the people, in the face of which, we believe, the
international community cannot and must not remain passive. It will not be
the mission of our soldiers in Rwanda to interpose themselves between the
warring parties, still less to influence in any way the military and political
situation. Our objective is simple: to rescue endangered civilians and put an
end to the massacres, and to do so in an impartial manner.”145
The French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, set five conditions for French
intervention: a UN mandate; a clear time limit for the operation; no in-depth
penetration of Rwandan territory; a strictly humanitarian purpose; and allied
involvement.146
On 22 June1994, the Security Council passed Resolution 929 authorizing the
French and Senegalese intervention.147 The resolution was determining that “the
magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and
security in the region”, and recognizing that “the current situation…demands an
urgent response by the international community”. The force was authorized to use
“all necessary means” to achieve the humanitarian objectives “that had been
established for UNAMIR in paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of Resolution 925”.148 The
words “all necessary means” meant that the multinational force was empowered to
use force. It was a Chapter VII operation. The resolution also set some limits on the
duration and purpose of the operation. The mission would be limited to a period of
two months, unless the Secretary General determined an earlier date that UNAMIR II
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could carry out its mandate. And, it would be a “strictly humanitarian, impartial and
neutral” operation.
The vote on Resolution 929 was 10 in favor, none against, and 5 abstentions
(Brazil, China, New Zealand, Nigeria and Pakistan).149 Those who voted in favor of
the resolution saw it as necessary due to the delays experienced in providing
sufficient support to UNAMIR.150 The delegations that abstained voiced concern
about “the intervention going forward at the same time that UN peacekeeping forces
were in Rwanda”.151 New Zealand explained its abstention as a concern that “trying
to run two separate operations in parallel with different command arrangements does
not work and, in the long run, those whom we set out to save can be those who
suffer.”152 This was not a strong argument, because the limited number of  UNAMIR
II troops were not functioning, and Operation Turquoise would end upon the full
deployment of UNAMIR II. Brazil asserted that “the Security Council should avoid
using its extraordinary Chapter VII powers in such cases” and noted “the difficulty in
simultaneously operating peacekeeping and “peace-forcing” operations in the same
state.”153
Resolution 929 is important, because it represented “only the sixth time in
UN history that the Security Council had authorized member states to use military
force under Chapter VII”.154 Although the UN gave the force its mandate, it neither
deployed nor commanded the troops that were sent to fulfill it. Another feature of
Operation Turquoise was that the costs of the mission were born by the countries
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supplying troops, with France bearing the lion’s share. Whereas the UN
peacekeeping missions like UNAMIR-I and UNAMIR-II were financed by
“mandatory assessments on all member states or by voluntary contributions
following the approval of their budgets by the General Assembly.”155 Operation
Turquoise cost $ 212 million (according to Vaccaro, $240 million).156 This was
approximately 1% of the French annual defense budget and was spent over the
operation’ sixty day duration.157
Operation Turquoise began on 22 June and ended on 21 August 1994.158 The
force was stationed at two sites in Zaire, Goma and Bukavu, near the Rwandan
border.159 On 23 June, a few hundred French troops in armored vehicles and
helicopters crossed from Zaire sixty miles into western Rwanda. The force
commander was French General Jean-Claude Lafourcade. In order to coordinate
French activities with UNAMIR II a French liaison office was established at
UNAMIR headquarters in Kigali.
At the height on 13 July, the multinational coalition comprised 2.552 French
troops and 508 African troops from 7 states (Chad, Congo, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau,
Mauritania, Niger and Senegal). With its air support including Jaguar and Mirage
aircraft as well as artillery and light armor, the force was giving the message that
“these were combat troops, not peacekeepers”.160 Among UN interventions in
Rwanda, Operation Turquoise is considered the most “successful” one, and this
success is mostly attributed to the force structure and its rules of engagement, which
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allowed force to be used “in circumstances where there was a threat to own forces, a
threat against the protected population, obstruction of the mission, and in a conflict
situation with refugees”.161
Within the first days of the operation some 8.000 Tutsis were rescued. This
was a success for the operation. But, Weiss noted, “after 13 days of the operation
only 1.325 more persons were identified as “at risk””, because by the time French
forces arrived the genocide was completed.162 This is why the French operation is
criticized for being three months late.
Following the announcement of the intervention, the RPF siege of Kigali and
its efforts to seize the rest of the country intensified. And this led to a renewed flood
of Hutu refugees, worsening the humanitarian crisis. They were encouraged in their
fears by radio propaganda of RTLM. It was telling Hutus that “the rebel government
and the French forces could not guarantee their security and they should cross into
Zaire immediately.”163 General Lafourcade noted that RTLM was undermining their
efforts and requested the means to spread positive information, emphasizing the
importance of a counter-radio station.164
In 1 July France announced its decision to establish a humanitarian protected
zone (HPZ) in the Cyangugu-Kibuye-Gikongoro triangle in south western Rwanda.
Resolution 929 had authorized the creation of safe areas in order to protect civilians.
The French forces deployed in the protection zone on 9 July. No armed forces were
to be allowed entry into the zone. Its purpose was “to prevent both genocidal
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retribution by the RPF against Hutus and a refugee tidal wave like the earlier one to
Goma”.165
On 4 July, the RPF had taken full control of Kigali. It expressed strong
opposition to the French initiative to establish a HPZ, raising concerns that “such
efforts would serve to protect the responsible for genocide and to preserve the Hutu-
led interim government”.166 Indeed, it was the case; although French officials stated
the HPZ created for humanitarian purposes only, many FAR troops were inside the
zone when it was created. And, the French provided sanctuary for these forces as
well.167 Despite its opposition, RPF did not attempt to enter the HPZ and no
confrontation occurred between RPF and Operation Turquoise forces.168
Within the HPZ, Operation Turquoise protected an estimated 11.500 to
14.000 civilians, remaining Tutsis and other groups at risk. In addition to its security
activities, the mission undertook relief support and modest direct relief. The most
important contributions were in health and sanitation.169 Weiss gives a detailed
account of these contributions:170
“The operation encompassed a standing medical unit, the Elément Médical
Militaire d’Intervention Rapide (EMMIR), and a mobile emergency
response team, Bioforce. With a staff of 49 personnel, EMMIR treated 300
civilians per day. Bioforce was especially vital, operating locally and
coordinating with NGOs. From 22 June to 30 September, the operation
carried out 1.100 surgical operations, 17.000 medical consultations, 11.000
days of hospitalization, 90.000 ambulatory treatments, 24.000 vaccinations,
and 24 births”
Operation Turquoise also protected humanitarian convoys traveling into the zone.
Thanks to the efforts by the mission mortality rate decreased sharply.
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On 17 July 1994, the town of Gisenyi fell to the RPF and with the exception
of the humanitarian zone controlled by the French-led multinational force, the entire
country came under RPF control.171 On 18 July RPF unilaterally declared a cease
fire. On 19 July it installed a broad based Government of National Unity, intended to
operate for a transitional period of five years.172 All parties to the Arusha Accord
received representation in the new government, with the exception of the former
ruling party MRND and the openly anti-Tutsi party, the CDR.173
The new president, Pasteur Bizimungu, immediately invited the return of all
refugees who wished. On 26 June 1994, he and the then President Mobutu Sese Seko
of Zaire issued a joint communiqué indicating their agreement on the return of all
refugees to Rwanda in freedom and dignity.174 President Sese Seko confirmed that
“the territory of Zaire would never be used by Rwandans or by anyone else for the
purpose of destabilizing Rwanda; former FAR military personnel in Zaire would be
disarmed and confined to barracks, and radio transmissions containing incitements to
ethnic hatred would be stopped immediately”.175 The UN, especially UNHCR,
undertook efforts to support the return of refugees.
The RPF victory marked the end of the civil conflict and massacres but had
no effect on the desperate humanitarian situation. The resources available to the aid
agencies and Operation Turquoise forces functioning in the area fell short of the
demand.176 “The largest camp, at Goma, Zaire, alone required 600 metric tons of
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food and 1 million gallons of purified water per day.”177 French government
informed the Secretary General that they could not cope with the massive flow of
refugees into the humanitarian zone and into Zaire, with the resources available to
them.178 According to France, “mitigation of the humanitarian disaster would be
possible only when the long-awaited international assistance entered into full
effect”.179 But as of 25 July there were less than 500 UNAMIR II troops on the
ground.
On 29 July, French troops began to withdraw despite UN pleas for them to
remain until UNAMIR II could fully deploy. In the face of difficulties in the
deployment of UNAMIR II Boutros-Ghali urgently requested governments to
provide the reinforcements and equipment necessary to bring UNAMIR to the
strength authorized by the resolution 918.180 In his appeal he emphasized that181
“Rwanda needs the help of the international community and will continue to
need it for foreseeable future. I am convinced that resources do exist. What
is required is the political will in the countries around the world coalescing
into a collective political will at the United Nations.”
As the scheduled departure of Operation Turquoise on 21 August 1994
neared, there were concerns that as the force pulled out the population in the
protection zone would flee to Zaire and Burundi out of the fear of RPF.182 To prevent
this from happening humanitarian agencies increased their presence and the delivery
of assistance to the zone. And, UNAMIR forces, in cooperation with Operation
Turquoise, developed a detailed plan for the transition to UNAMIR II. The African
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Units serving with France were organized into a combined unit and transferred to
UNAMIR II.
As mentioned above, UNAMIR II began deploying troops on 10 August, but
it could reach its authorized strength by the end of November.183 During the period
between the withdrawal of Operation Turquoise forces and deployment of UNAMIR
II, the disastrous humanitarian crisis necessitated additional support to be provided
by states unilaterally. There was an extreme shortage of food and water, and cholera
and dysentery were spreading through the camps. The United States was the first
country to offer noncombatant military support to help deliver relief.184 It was
followed by other countries including the United Kingdom (Operation Gabriel),
Australia (Operation Tamar), Canada (Operation Lance) and Japan.185
III.e. US Operation Support Hope and Additional Unilateral
Support:
 Facing the above-mentioned humanitarian crisis that worsened after the
withdrawal of Operation Turquoise, US President Clinton directed the commander in
chief of US European Command, General George Joulwan, on 22 July 1994, to
provide assistance to humanitarian organizations to stop the dying in Goma.186
Joulwan, in turn, assigned Army Lieutenant General Daniel Schroeder to command a
US humanitarian assistance operation, Operation Support Hope. Any reference to
“peacekeeping” or “enforcement” was avoided in Clinton’s “disaster response”.187
The operation was conducted until 29 September 1994. General Joulwan and General
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Dallaire worked out a concept of operations for humanitarian relief. There was not a
UN authorization for Operation Support Hope and other unilateral support
operations. The Secretary General urged the US and other countries providing
unilateral support to place their forces under UNAMIR command, but the US did not
accept it.188
The operation had two goals: stop the dying and turn relief efforts over
private organizations.189 Within four days of deployment, US troops were producing
24.000 gallons of potable water a day in Goma, a figure that soared to 431.000
gallons a day by mid-August.190 Thanks to US relief efforts, deaths from disease,
which were averaging as many as six thousand per day, dropped to approximately
five hundred per day.191 In addition to purifying water, US troops dug mass graves
and latrines in the Goma camps, increased the capacity of regional airports, including
Kigali, and help the UN Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO) to coordinate the
efforts of the aid organizations.192
The operation was coordinated by the European Command in Germany, and
composed of two task forces: Joint Task Force Bravo in Kigali, and Joint Task Force
Alpha in Goma.193 The operation was run in Kigali, Entebbe, and Goma by the Civil-
Military Operations Command (CMOC). The force peaked near 2.500 in early
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August, consisting of mostly logistic troops and an infantry company, that served as
a small quick reaction force.194
By the end of the mission, which officially concluded on 30 September, the
US had flown over twelve hundred missions, delivered almost fifteen thousand tons
of humanitarian relief supplies, and produced millions of gallons of potable water.195
The US contribution was noteworthy but its “delayed, limited and short-term” nature
was criticized.196 When Operation Support Hope withdrew from Goma on 28
August, the mortality rate was still 500 per day. But, General Joulwan declared “The
emergency for the most part is over. There is still problems, but they are [private
relief groups’ and the UN’s] problems and not US military.”197 Joulwan’s statement
reflected America’s caution toward peace operations and overriding US concern for
“zero body bags” behind the PDD-25.198
In addition to American Operation Support Hope, nine countries provided
direct military resources, which differ considerably in size and nature.199 The United
Kingdom undertook Operation Gabriel similar to Operation Support Hope. Canada,
which participated in UNAMIR with 400 troops, undertook three operations:
Operation Lance to support humanitarian aid,200 Operation Passage for medical aid
and Operation Scotch for air transport. Operation Passage comprised of 200
personnel, including medical personnel, security, support and engineering staff.201
Together with Operation Scotch it treated some 22.000 patients and delivered 2.600
metric tons of supplies to Kigali, Goma and Bujubura.
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The Netherlands, under the command of UNAMIR, trained and equipped the
Zambian contingent. Operating between 4 August and 4 September, the Dutch
contingent provided 100 vehicles (heavy trucks and light transport), 10 mobile
kitchens, and electric generators.202 Furthermore, Dutch grants to the UNHCR
funded meningitis vaccines for 150.000 civilians and supplied other medical and
health supplies.203
Germany, Australia and New Zealand provided air transport services. They
carried tons of supplies, and supplied water purification and transport equipment.204
Israel and Japan focused on fulfilling medical needs. Named “Operation Interns for
Hope” the Israeli Defense Forces mission provided both air transport and medical
assistance from 25 July to 31 August. Beginning in October, the Japanese contingent
of 260 troops contributed sanitation and water purification.205 And, Ireland sent
specialists in the fields of engineering, medicine, logistics, security, communications
and administration.206
III.f. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR):
Since the establishment of the new government, the international community
has been working to (1) resettle internally displaced persons and refugees, (2)
develop governmental institutions and the country’s infrastructure, and (3) realize
justice for crimes against humanity.207 Human Rights Field Operation (HRFOR) and
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International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were the main tools used to
implement part three of this strategy.
The Secretary General Boutros-Ghali reported to the Security Council that
the first priority in Rwanda was the resolution of the humanitarian crisis. It was
necessary to achieve a sense of justice for peace and reconciliation. He said “legal
measures were required to investigate the events and impose penalties for those
determined to have been responsible for the crime of genocide and other violations of
human rights.”208 Towards these ends, the Commission on Human Rights, its Special
Rapporteur, the Secretary General and Commission of Experts established by
Boutros-Ghali pursuant to SC resolution 935 (1994) took action. The Security
Council established an International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the
Human Rights Field Operation (HRFOR), “an on-the-ground presence aimed at
deterring further violations of human rights, promoting the rule of law and building
confidence in general”.209
The High Commissioner for Human Rights had visited Rwanda on 11-12
May. In a subsequent report he suggested that the Commission “appoint a Special
Rapporteur for Rwanda and arrange for the Special Rapporteur to be supported by a
field operation, staffed by human rights specialists, to assist in the collection and
analysis of the information on the genocide, to monitor the ongoing situation, to deter
human rights violations and to promote national reconciliation.”210 The Commission
convened and endorsed High Commissioner’s recommendation on 24-25 may 1994,
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laying the foundation for the Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (HRFOR).211
A first group of five officers was fielded during the period from June to August
1994.212
In July 1994 the Security Council passed resolution 935, which authorized
the creation of a Commission of Experts to examine the evidence of gross violations
of human rights.213 It’s mandate was “to investigate at fist hand the human rights
situation in Rwanda and to receive relevant and credible information from
governments, individuals, intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations”.214 The Commission was also requested to examine “the question of
jurisdiction, whether international or municipal, before which such persons could be
brought to trial”.215
Boutros-Ghali established the Commission of Experts composed of Mr. Atsu-
Koffi Amega (Togo), Ms. Habi Dieng (Guinea) and Mr. Salifou Fomba (Mali), on 26
July 1994, and the Commission began its work on 15 August 1994. In August, the
government of Rwanda concludes an agreement with the High Commissioner to
increase the number of human rights officers to 147. In the agreement the objectives
and the functions of the operation (HRFOR) were defined as follows:216
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a) carrying out investigations into violations of human rights and
humanitarian law, including possible acts of genocide,
b) monitoring the ongoing human rights situation, helping to prevent
such violations through the presence of human rights field officers,
c) cooperating with other international agencies to re-establish
confidence and facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons
and the rebuilding of civil society,
d) implementing programs of technical cooperation in the field of
human rights, particularly in the area of the administration of justice,
to help Rwanda rebuild its shattered judiciary and to provide human
rights education to all levels of Rwandese society.
The first human rights field officers were deployed in September 1994, and
during the first months of 1995 it became fully operational. As of 1 April 1995,
HRFOR was composed of “113 staff in 11 field offices, including 67 fixed-term
staff, 34 UN volunteers, and 12 human rights officers contributed by the Commission
of the European Communities”.217 All information and evidentiary materials
collected by HRFOR was regularly forwarded to the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, the Special Rapporteur, and the International Tribunal.
In its first interim report, the Commission of Experts concluded that “there
exist overwhelming evidence to prove that acts of genocide against the Tutsi group
were perpetrated by Hutu elements in a concerted, planned, systematic and
methodical way”, and that the “mass exterminations perpetrated by Hutu elements
against the Tutsi group…constitute genocide.”218 Furthermore, the Commission
recommended that the Security Council take all necessary and effective action to
“ensure that the individuals responsible… are brought to justice before an
independent and impartial international criminal tribunal.”
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On 8 November 1994, having determined that the genocide and other flagrant
violations of human rights committed in Rwanda “constitute a threat to international
peace and security” within the scope of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security
Council established an ad hoc tribunal by resolution 955.219 According to Boutros-
Ghali, the recourse to Chapter VII was deemed necessary to ensure a speedy and
expeditious method of establishing the tribunal as well as to ensure the cooperation
of Rwanda and other related states in the region.220 Under Article 28 of the Statue of
the ICTR, states were under an obligation to cooperate with the ICTR and to comply
with any of its requests, including the arrest or detention of persons and the surrender
or transfer of suspects.
ICTR was established for “the prosecution of persons responsible for
genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in
the territory of Rwanda and of Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other
such violations committed in the territory of the neighboring states between 1
January and 31 December 1994.221 The resolution passed with Rwanda voting
against and China abstaining. The new government of Rwanda itself had requested
the Council to create such a tribunal.222 However, at the adoption of the resolution
Rwanda objected to the Tribunal, principally because of “the Tribunal’s inability to
order the death penalty, its limited temporal jurisdiction (the temporal jurisdiction of
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the ICTR is according to Article 1, limited to the year 1994), and concerns that its
seat would be far from Rwanda”.223
The subject matter jurisdiction of the ICTR covers the crime of genocide
(Article 2), crimes against humanity (Article 3), and violations of Article 3 common
to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (Article 4). The tribunal is
competent to judge persons who “planned, instigated, ordered, committed or
otherwise aided and abetted” in executing the crimes within its jurisdiction.224 Article
2 of the Statue defines “genocide” as follows:
“Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such:
a) Killing members of the group;
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”
The Statue of the ICTR was elaborated by negotiations between members of
the Security Council, especially the United States, New Zealand and Rwanda, at that
time a non-permanent member of the SC. The Statue was, with few exceptions
identical to the Statue of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY).225 The prosecutor of the ICTY would also serve as the
prosecutor of the ICTR. Like the ICTY, it would be technically a subsidiary, though
                                                          
223 Its seat was in Arusha, Tanzania, Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams, Accountability for
Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1997, p. 174.
224 Human Rights Watch, “Leave None to Tell the Story”, Justice and Responsibility, p. 2.
225 The UN and Rwanda, p. 65.
110
independent, organ of the Security Council. The sharing of the common rules,
institutions and organizational structure is aimed at efficiency, quick establishment
and economy.226
The Security Council concerned about the safety of staff and trial participants
as well as about logistical considerations and decided to place the trial chambers in
Arusha, Tanzania. The Tribunal was originally established with two chambers, each
of three judges, and an appeals chamber of five judges. But, in response to slow
progress of trials and the large numbers of accused already in custody, the Security
Council added a third chamber of three judges to the tribunal on 30 April 1998. The
Tribunal issued its first indictments on 28 November 1995, and held its first plenary
session on January 1996.227
The trial process was very slow because of financial and administrative
problems. Furthermore, it was hampered by the lack of phone lines, power supplies
and secure buildings.228 The heads of the tribunal’s three sections were stationed in
different countries. The prosecutor and appeals chamber were located in the Hague,
the investigatory unit and prosecutor’s office were in Kigali, and the trial chambers
were in Arusha.229 Cases took too long to reach trial; the process was alien to the
Rwandans, the tribunal was distant, and because of the difficulties in ensuring
protection of witnesses, potential witnesses feared reprisals if they testified and so
refused to do so.230
There were also problems in the relationship between the Rwandan
government and the Tribunal. Human Rights Watch Report examines the problems
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together with the comprehension of the work of the ICTR by the Rwandan people.
According to the report,
“in 1997 the Rwandan government sharply criticized the tribunal. It demanded
the Judge Arbour be removed and that a separate prosecutor be designated
exclusively to handle cases in Rwanda. Secretary General of the Ministry of
Justice, Gerald Gahima, expressed scepticism about the tribunal… “People
should aspire to prevent these crimes, not to punish them adequately after they
had been committed.””231
Despite these problems, the ICTR has managed to make a powerful
contribution. It gives the message that the international community will not tolerate
such abuses of human rights.232 It is the first international court to convict a person
for genocide, and its decisions concerning the international law on genocide are now
an important part of the fledgling efforts to turn the 1948 code into enforceable
law.233 The ICTR has also succeeded in getting many of the alleged leaders of the
genocide into its prison in Arusha.234
According to the ICTR website summarizing the achievements of the
Tribunal, since its establishment in Arusha and Kigali in 1995, the ICTR has:235
• Secured the arrest of over 40 individuals accused of involvement in
the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Among those arrested were the former
Prime Minister and several other members of the interim Government
of Rwanda during the genocide as well as senior military leaders and
high ranking government officials;
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• Convicted several of those arrested for genocide and crimes against
humanity, including the Prime Minister, Jean Kambanda. This was the
first time that a head of government had been convicted for such a
crime;
• Laid down definitions in international law, which will serve as
precedents for other International Criminal Tribunals and for courts
all over the world;
• Obtained the cooperation of the international community in the arrest
of suspects, the travel of witnesses to Arusha, the detention of
convicted persons and, in general, support for its aims and activities.
Security Council issued two important resolutions regulating the ICTR. In its
Resolution 978, adopted on 27 February 1995, Security Council emphasized the
importance of taking all measures for the early and effective functioning of the
tribunal.236 The resolution urged all states to arrest and detain persons found within
their territory against whom there is sufficient evidence that they were responsible
for acts within the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for Rwanda. It also
condemned all attacks against persons in the refugee camps near the borders of
Rwanda, demanded that such attacks immediately cease, and called upon states to
take appropriate steps to prevent such attacks.
In its Resolution 1329, adopted on 30 November 2000, the Security Council
underlined that it is acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.237 It decided to
amend articles 11, 12 and 13 of the Statue of the ICTR and to replace those articles
with the provision set out in Annex II to the Resolution. These amendments were
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about composition of the Chambers (Article 11), qualification and election of judges
(Article 12), and officers and members of the Chambers (Article 13). The Resolution
also urged all states to cooperate fully with the ICTR and their organs in accordance
with their obligations under resolutions 827 (1993) and 955 (1994) and the statutes of
the International Tribunals.
The ICTR is still functioning and information about its achievements and
failures, and cases can be found on the official website of the ICTR. The President of
the ICTR, Judge Navanethem Pillay (South Africa), is responsible for presenting
annual reports to the General Assembly. The Fifth Annual Report of the Tribunal
activities presented by her on 20 November 2000 reveals the latest developments
about the Tribunal.
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CHAPTER IV
CRITICAL ANALYSIS: REASONS FOR “FAILURE” AND LESSONS
LEARNED
More killings were compressed into three months in Rwanda in 1994 than
occurred in four years in the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995.1 And, this
humanitarian crisis, killing 14 % of the population in the three months, took place in
the presence of the international community’s forces. This chapter aims to analyze
the Rwanda crisis and international community’s failure according to the framework
established in Chapter I (criteria that justify humanitarian intervention, legal bases
for intervention, etc.). It asks questions like, “How can we define the UN
intervention in Rwanda?”, “How does Rwanda case reveal the difficulties the UN
face with, in terms of humanitarian intervention?”, Why were the signals of the
coming genocide ignored? Why were they not translated into effective conflict
management?, “How can we assess the success/failure of the operations in
Rwanda?”, “Could UNAMIR be successful if better managed?”, “How can we
explain the failure of the international community in this case?”, and “What lessons
can be drawn from this experience?”.
In the analysis, the starting point should be the overwhelming reality of
genocide and legal obligations stemming from the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the UN Charter and other
relevant human rights conventions, mentioned in Chapter 1 of this study, requiring
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international community to take action. The gravity of the humanitarian situation in
Rwanda fully meets the definition of genocide and the criteria that justify
humanitarian intervention.2 Rwanda had acceded to the Genocide Convention on 15
April 1975. And, as UN’s Special Rapporteur indicated “the victims of the attacks,
Tutsis in the overwhelming majority of the cases, have been targeted solely because
of their membership of a certain ethnic group, and for no other reason”.3
The determination by the UN that the killings in Rwanda constituted “a threat
to world peace and security” confirms that the situation does not fall within the
domestic jurisdiction of Rwanda. And it requires, under Article 39 of the UN
Charter, to bring into action Chapter VII on enforcement measures. When the UN
defined the situation in Rwanda as “genocide” legal bases for military action were
strengthened. In short, humanitarian intervention in Rwanda was “militarily
justifiable” and “morally obligatory”. Even the authors who define the criteria for
humanitarian intervention in the strictest and Realist manner, like Michael O’Hanlon,
acknowledge that fact, stating powerful states like the United States should have
intervened in Rwanda militarily.4
The range of responses to the Rwanda crisis may be categorized as follows:
1) the international community’s response to the civil war, 2) the international
community’s response to the genocide that started after the 6 April 1994, 3) the
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international humanitarian assistance to the survivors inside Rwanda and to the huge
refugee camps in neighboring countries, and 4) the international assistance to
repatriation and rehabilitation of refugees, and to recovery and reconstruction of the
Rwandan government and society after the upheaval.
How can we define the UN intervention in Rwanda? The answer would
change, as mentioned before, according to the definition we adopt. Since this study
adopts the “classical” definition; “UN authorized coercive intervention for primarily
humanitarian purposes”, it reaches to the conclusion that UN intervention in Rwanda
was a “failed humanitarian intervention”. While UNAMIR I was designed as a
peacekeeping force without enforcement powers of Chapter VII, Operation
Turquoise, a coercive Chapter VII operation and UNAMIR II imposing an arms
embargo under Chapter VII of the UN Charter were late to prevent or stop the
genocide. International community did intervene in Rwanda with humanitarian
purposes, and achieved important humanitarian outcomes. But its response could not
prevent or stop the genocide. Given the complexity of the situation, the dramatic
speed of the slaughter and the difficulty of “rapid response”, it would be unfair to
define UN response as “lack of action” or “non-intervention”.5 But, the severity of
the situation necessitated an earlier and stronger response.
The crisis in Rwanda was a “complex emergency” with all the difficulties of
humanitarian intervention examined in Chapter 1. Reluctance to intervene, UN’s
dependency on its members, lack of US leadership, inadequate resources, financial
crisis in the overburdened UN, co-ordination problems, and “inadequate mandate” of
the UNAMIR, together explain very well the failure in Rwanda.
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The response involved an unprecedented number of agencies and
organizations. Thus, coordination problem was one of the most serious problems. At
least seven UN agencies and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, approximately
250 NGOs, at least eight contingents, the ICRC, and various national Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies were involved in the humanitarian response. With so many
agencies and organizations involved, there was a critical need for a strong capacity to
provide leadership and overall coordination.6
Furthermore, political climate was not suitable for a stronger intervention.
UNAMIR had misfortune to be established in the wake of the “Somalia debacle” and
during the continuous traumas of UNPROFOR in Bosnia. France and the United
Kingdom were heavily involved militarily on the ground in the UN force in Bosnia.
These operations absorbed 75% of the 70.000 troops then committed to UN
peacekeeping worldwide.7 Examination of the political environment is a useful
means to explain the “lack of will” and the relationship between interest (or
perception of interest) and intervention action.
UNAMIR was authorized just two days after the death of 18 American
soldiers in Mogadishu, Somalia. Bowen says,8
“The death of US servicemen and the televised sight of their bodies being
dragged through the streets of Mogadishu inevitably generated Congressional
and public pressure for the Clinton administration to limit its actions on the
international stage and to define the US national interest in narrow, domestic
terms at a time of major domestic economic and societal decay in America.”
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The Clinton administration’s early enthusiasm for “assertive multilateralism” ended
with the debacle in Somalia. In his address to the General Assembly in October
1993, he said that the United Nations must learn to say “no” to peacekeeping
operations that were not feasible.9
In order to understand the “lack of US leadership” in Rwanda case, we should
examine “the politics of US participation”.10 In addition to anti-peacekeeping
sentiments in Congress, there was an ongoing debate about Washington’s fair share
of UN costs, about foreign command of American forces and about US participation
in a future UN or NATO force to implement a peace accord in Bosnia.11 The rising
cost of UN operations was also a growing source of friction between Congress and
the White House. The cost increased six folds between 1990 and 1993 at a time when
Congress and the Executive were struggling to reduce the deficit and regular defence
budgets were falling.12 Disaster in Somalia made it very difficult to provide full
funding thereafter, either for UN operations or for the US share of the regular UN
budget.
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As a result of media, public and Congressional pressure for the US to avoid
involvement in overseas crises, the Clinton administration had to formulate a foreign
policy rationale defining when, how and why the US will use military force overseas.
Academicians had already defined criteria for US military intervention in
“isolationist” terms. Common to these definitions were the conditions that: “there
must be an identifiable interest at stake; the intervention must have potential to
succeed; and the likely benefits of intervening should outweigh the likely costs once
projected responses of allies and adversaries are factored in.” Clinton’s definition,
PDD-25, too, emphasized American military non-involvement in operations in places
where national security is not directly threatened. The guidelines in the Directive
include: impact on US national interests, availability of troops and funds, the
necessity of US participation, congressional approval, a clear date for withdrawal,
and acceptable command and control agreements.13 And, apparently Rwanda did not
meet these criteria. US Assistant Secretary of Defense Charles W. Freeman said in
May 1994 “US strategic interests in Africa are very modest”.14
Meanwhile, the US government played a critical role in humanitarian relief
efforts by carrying out Operation Support Hope and providing the seed money for
humanitarian aid.15 For 1994-1995 the US government spent $490.49 million on the
Rwanda crisis, independent of its contributions to UN operations or programs of
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other international agencies. The importance of these figures can be understood only
when they are compared with the figures of UNAMIR and Operation Turquoise.
Total military cost of the Rwandan conflict to the UN was $449.7 million, and the
cost of French Operation Turquoise was $212 million.16 This shows the fact that
there are fewer risks for politicians from humanitarian assistance than from early
preventive action. Natsios interprets, “the relief response was a politically
inexpensive way for the United States to avoid the commitment of troops or
logistical support, at least until the CNN effect went into high gear”.17
While the US remained reluctant to intervene in Rwanda, France undertook
the most effective military operation; Operation Turquoise. Because, France had long
had important economic and political interests in this part of Africa that has four
times as many French speakers as in France itself.18 France’s interests were
manifold: the fear of “domino theory”; the fear that the overthrow of French-backed
regime and the failure of French intervention to protect it would threaten
neighbouring pro-French leaders19; the need to secure the northern region of Zaire,
which would have destabilised by uncontrolled refugee flows; and most importantly,
to secure French objectives by engaging in what could be shown to be a
humanitarian exercise, and thereby to downplay the negative publicity of France’s
support for the Habyarimana regime.20
                                                                                                                                                                    
15 Vaccaro, p. 398.
16 Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance (eds.), The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in
the Global Arena, New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1999, pp. 65, 69.
17  Andrew S. Natsios, US Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Humanitarian
Relief in Complex Emergencies, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Connecticut,
London: Praeger, 1997, p. 132.
18 Stephen A. Garrett, Doing Good and Doing Well: An Examination of Humanitarian Intervention,
Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger, 1999, p. 111.
19 Mel McNulty, “France’s Role in Rwanda and External Military Intervention: A Double
Discrediting”, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 4, No. 3, Autumn 1997, p. 31.
20 Bruce D. Jones, “Intervention without Borders : Humanitarian Intervention in Rwanda 1990-1994”,
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2, p. 231.
121
In order to understand the motives behind the French intervention, we should
first examine the “Franco-Rwandan patron-client relationship” of inherently
interventionary nature.21 France incorporated Belgium’s former colonial territories
-Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire- into the “Franco-African family” in the mid-1970s
on the understanding that, “secured in power with French support, their governments
would be equally compliant”.22 They were linked to France by means of defense
treaties, which are concerned with French military power in Africa, and military
technical assistance accords, which are concerned with the French army’s creation of
and ongoing support for the armies of its African allies.23
In 1975 French President Valéry Giscard signed a military-technical
assistance accord with the Rwandan President General Habyarimana. Francois
Mitterand continued this policy.24 When the Rwandan war broke out in 1990, the
Franco-Rwandan treaty of 1975 was invoked as a legitimisation for French
intervention (French support to Habyarimana government against RPF attack across
the Ugandan border).25 French felt obliged to respond to the RPF attack, but this
background diminished France’s credibility when it undertook the Operation
Turquoise for “humanitarian purposes”.
By intervening only in the western part of Rwanda, where the Hutu
government forces were on run, France initially gave the appearance of favoring the
Hutus. The Hutu-dominated government forces welcomed the French intervention,
whereas the RPF did not trust France. Not only parties to the conflict but also
outsiders thought “Paris still favored the deposed French-speaking Hutu government
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over the English-speaking leadership of the RPF”.26  Therefore, France entered the
fray with little credibility. However, over time French credibility was enhanced
because its rhetoric was supported by its actions.
France has always been criticized because of her motives for the intervention
in Rwanda. Some authors even claim that French intervention in Rwanda has been a
“primary cause of the prolongation and extension of the conflict in the region”,
discrediting both France’s and the UN’s role.27 But, it is clear that Operation
Turquoise was the most effective operation in Rwanda, and made great contributions
to the situation there. So, it was better to do something, even in self-interest, as
France did, rather than to stand aside doing nothing.
When we compare the American and French responses to the Rwanda crisis,
we see that domestic politics and national interests can both propel and constrain
intervention. Indeed, some semblance of a “national interest” must be present for a
country to commit troops and resources to an intervention, especially in a “complex
emergency” like Rwanda crisis. The comparison of American and French responses
display the relationship between “interest” and “intervention”, which is of a great
importance in the assessment of international community’s response to Rwanda
crisis. This relationship also explains why Belgium, the former colonial power, was
the biggest contributor to UNAMIR I, and why it withdrew its forces in the most
critical time.
In the assessment of the response of international community, two questions;
“how can we assess UN operations according to criteria for success/failure?” and
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“could the Rwandan Genocide have been prevented?” are critical. As mentioned in
Chapter 1, different actors and constituencies have different criteria for evaluating
success. The most comprehensive definition of success has been made by Duane
Bratt, who lists four distinct criteria for measuring success: mandate performance,
facilitating conflict resolution, conflict containment and limiting casualties.28 These
criteria ask whether the peacekeeping operation successfully completed its mandate,
whether the operation was able to facilitate the conflict resolution of the underlying
causes of a conflict, whether the operation prevented major powers or neighboring
states from intervening in the conflict, and whether the operation limited casualties.
But, even such a complete set of criteria should be used with caution. Because, even
with the same criteria, authors may reach different conclusions about success/failure
of UN operations.
Weiss challenges us to consider the difficulties of evaluating success/failure
of intervention in Rwanda by saying,29
 “With one quarter of the population either dead or displaced, the approval of
Operation Turquoise [fifteen weeks after the violence killed half million people]
could be seen as a failure by the community of states to make a prompt decision. At
the same time, from the point of view of forestalling future additional deaths,
displacement and disease, it could be seen as a “partial success”.”
According to Duanne Bratt, while UNOMUR and UNAMIR-I are examples
of “failure”, UNAMIR-II is a moderate success at mandate performance, because it
could effectively complete several aspects of its mandate.30
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Vaccaro makes a different assessment; according to his account, “UNAMIR-I
accomplished its assigned tasks, indeed, initially it was ahead of schedule in making
preparations for the demobilization and integration of the former belligerents.”31
Therefore, it was successful at mandate performance, but could not prevent or stop
the genocide. UNAMIR-II contributed a lot, after it was finally deployed. But, by the
time it was deployed, the war was over and the killing had largely stopped. He says
Operation Turquoise must be considered a success.32
Jones argues that a robust theory of intervention should consider both
motivation and outcomes in assessing any humanitarian action. He categorizes and
evaluates intervention actions in Rwanda according to these two criteria.33 He
defines UNAMIR-I as a “failed humanitarian intervention”, deployed for largely
humanitarian reasons but produced an outcome substantially less humanitarian than
the reinforcement alternative. He defines Operation Turquoise as “ an intervention
which produced humanitarian outcomes despite its motivations”, and UNAMIR II as
a “successful humanitarian intervention” with its humanitarian motives and
outcomes.34
K. Magyar and E. Morgan’s assessment is very different; they claim “the
Rwandan peacekeeping operation was successful”. They continue as follows:
“All of the parties to the conflict gave high praise to the peacekeepers: for
example, Alexis Kenyarengwe, Chairman of the RPF, noted that [the
peacekeeping force] served the Rwandan people admirably…The success of
the peacekeeping operation can be attributed to two major factors. First, the
OAU had the political will. Second, the peacekeepers had a better
understanding of the conflict; and thus, they related better to the combatants.”
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The obvious thing is that these operations saved lives, accomplished their
mandates which are defined narrowly, but were unable to prevent or stop the
genocide and establish lasting security conditions. UNAMIR was not a suitable
choice. When we compare the peace operations of the UN in Rwanda, Operation
Turquoise was the most successful one. But, international community’s response in
the face of genocide in Rwanda was a failure. Because, instead of taking stronger
action as the situation required, UNAMIR witnessed to the killing of 14% of the
Rwanda population in three months.
We can explain the success of Operation Turquoise by comparing its mandate
with those of UNAMIR I and UNAMIR II. Operation Turquoise deployed under a
Chapter VII enforcement authorization, came equipped for the task, and followed
rules of engagement that permitted it to back up threats with force. Whereas
UNAMIR, deployed under Chapter VI, had neither the mandate nor the means to
take effective military action to protect victims of the slaughter, even in self-defense.
UNAMIR-II, too, operated under a Chapter VI mandate, even though there existed
an undeniable possibility that widespread violence could be renewed.
In order to make a better evaluation of the success or failure of UN
intervention in Rwanda, we should also ask “could the Rwandan genocide have been
prevented?” The common answer is “yes”.35 Everyone agrees that “had the
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international community responded more effectively and earlier, most of those who
died probably have survived and much of the massive expenditures on the provision
of humanitarian assistance been unnecessary”.36Of course, this is a theoretical
exercise, and it is easy to be wise after the fact. But, it does not change the fact that
the necessary response was a serious international military force to deter the killers.
The question was put forward by the Commander of UNAMIR, Major
General Romeo Dallaire. He claimed that 5.000 troops operating under a peace
enforcement mission (Chapter VII of the UN Charter) with air force,
communications, and logistics support, could have:37 1) prevented massive violence;
2) assisted in the return of refugees and displaced persons; 3) protected the flow of
humanitarian aid; and 4) provided a secure environment to enable talks between
Hutus and Tutsis to devise mechanisms to ease tensions between the ethnic groups.
The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, the Institute for
the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, and the US Army convened an
international panel to explore the Rwandan experience and assess the validity of
General Dallaire’s assertion.38 The panel generally agreed that early military
intervention-within two weeks of the initial violence- by a force of 5.000 could have
made a significant difference in the level of violence in Rwanda and that there was a
window of opportunity for the deployment of this force during April 7-21, 1994. The
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group acknowledged that such a force would have had to be properly trained,
equipped, and supported, and possess a mandate from the Security Council to enable
it to use “all means necessary” to protect vulnerable populations. According to the
Report, in Rwanda in 1994, it is likely that 5.000 troops could have averted the
slaughter of a half-million people.
Alan J. Kuperman finds the claim that 5.000 troops deployed at the outset of
the killing could have prevented the genocide insupportable.39 He argues that such a
claim ignores the fact that 5.000 UN troops could not have been deployed overnight.
According to his account, it is also unrealistic to argue that urgent intervention
should have been launched on April 10, given that the international community did
not realize genocide was under way until at least ten days later.40 He concludes that
although some lives could have been saved by intervention of any size at any point
during the genocide, even a large force deployed immediately upon reports of
attempted genocide would not have been able to save even half of the ultimate
victims.41
We cannot know whether such a force, given an appropriate mandate and
extra means, could have stopped the genocide. Whereas, the fact that the “enemy”
was not a conventional, well-armed military force, but poorly armed and trained
para-military and civilian gangs supports the argument that UNAMIR would have
been more effective.42 Firm and coherent international censure could have influenced
the organizers of the genocide and diminished the killing in Rwanda substantially.
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The assessment of UN operations according to the criteria for success/failure
and the examination of whether Rwanda genocide could have been prevented help us
diagnose the “failure” of the international community. Here, it is important to state
that the failure to intervene cannot be judged solely in terms of moral imperatives,
practical dimensions especially politics and dilemmas of intervention must be
accommodated as well. We cannot explain the failure in Rwanda as US’ indifference
or UN’s incompetence. Reasons for the failure are complex, thus it is vital to
examine them carefully in order to understand the failure in Rwanda and draw
lessons for future crises.
  IV.a. Reasons for Failure:
Weak political support for reconciliation by internal and external actors is one
of the main reasons for the failure of Arusha Peace Process.43 As mentioned before,
the problem for the Arusha Accords was that extremists from President
Habyarimana’s party and the army did not support reconciliation with the RPF.
UNAMIR-I, as it was structured, could not overcome this fundamental obstacle to
implementing Arusha. When Arusha Peace Process failed and genocide began this
“indifference” had worse results. The lack of political will on the part of the US in
showing its leadership in terms of making any substantial commitment affected other
states’ attitude towards stronger action. Hesitation in Rwanda was due to the absence
of US geopolitical interests and the “Somalia Syndrome”.44
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Deployment of a peacekeeping force was a wrong decision; UNAMIR might
have proved adequate had the situation called for peacekeeping.45 The Secretariat
designed UNAMIR as a traditional peacekeeping operation, dependent on the good
will of the parties and with symbolic presence and capabilities. It was not designed to
match the requirements of the Arusha Peace Agreement, much less the urgent need
for a strong response to stop the genocide.46 As Francis K. Abiew says “Rwanda
should have rated a much stronger force, such as was sent to Bosnia, or Somalia.
Inaction contributed to the Hutu extremists belief that they could carry out their
genocide”.47
Financial crisis in the UN and economic concerns of member states were
among the factors preventing effective international response. Faced with escalating
costs for peacekeeping operations, the UN staff and members wanted not just
success, but success at low cost. Demands for economy, loudly voiced by the US and
others led to the establishment of a force only one third the size of that was originally
recommended and with a mandate that was also scaled down from that was specified
by the peace accords.48 The concern for economy prevailed even after massive
slaughter had taken place and delayed the deployment of the UNAMIR II.49
The UN claims that another reason for the failure was lack of information
analysis. Although, the UN had the knowledge and was warned that genocide was
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being planned,50 UN argues that there was not enough accurate analysis available to
the Council.51
 IV.b. Dilemmas of the Intervention in Rwanda:
Dilemmas prevent effective intervention action. Therefore, it is important to
review the dilemmas of the “intervention” in Rwanda in order to understand the
“failure” of the international community.
In any humanitarian intervention, there is a natural trade off between
intervening early and intervening late. It is highly desirable to intervene as soon as
possible in a conflict that seems destined to be severe. But it is also difficult, because
reaching a rapid judgement about the nature of the conflict, formulating an
intervention strategy accordingly and reaching the wrong decision can be disastrous.
Authorities in the UN claim that this dilemma played an important role in the
decision making process, especially while responding to famous “11 January
Cable”.52
Military considerations are as just important as political ones and they slow
down the decision making process. Operations in complex humanitarian emergencies
are multidimensional and difficult. They involve long-range transport, logistics
support at great distances, forced-entry capabilities and difficult tactical operations
such as convoy escort.53 In many cases they also meet significant resistance. Rwanda
was a “complex emergency” as mentioned before. There were a civil war between
Hutus and Tutsis in addition to the genocide and refugees and internally displaced
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persons in miserable conditions. It was a challenging environment and to reach a
consensus on the modality of intervention took some time.
Rwanda case clearly demonstrates the dilemma between moral imperatives
and practical concerns. The unprecedented humanitarian assistance contrasts with the
lack of concerted efforts to intervene militarily.54 Donor countries, which remained
reluctant to intervene militarily,  were prepared to allocate substantial resources,
particularly in the second half of 1994 to humanitarian assistance programs.55
Humanitarian dilemma in refugee camps was another problem.56 The massive
influx of Rwandans into refugee camps in former Zaire was not only a movement of
refugees but also of Hutu extremists (ex-Rwandan army regulars, former government
officials and militia).57 They planned to use the refugee camps as a staging area for
their return to political power. Because international humanitarian relief agencies,
including Doctors Without Borders (MSF) and UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) could not separate them from ordinary refugees, they consolidated
military control over the camps. And, in December 1994 a new government of
Rwanda in exile was declared, and incursions from the camps began. 58
The humanitarian agencies could not decide whether to withdraw from the
camps not to feed the genocidal criminals, or to continue their humanitarian action
for the sake of innocent people. MSF says “resources for the criminals would be cut
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off, but so would those for the refugees, the majority of whom are innocent victims
of odious manipulation by the extremists”.59 It was a dilemma between humanitarian
ethics vs. medical duty, moral responsibility vs. the Hippocratic oath.60 As a
response, MSF and UNHCR reduced their activities to the vital minimum, and
demanded the UN to set up the necessary controls to stop Hutu extremists taking
away the aid for refugees.61
Clashing interests, competition for resources, and the complex organizational
structures of external humanitarian actors complicate the dilemmas of humanitarian
intervention. Moreover, the context in which humanitarian dilemmas in war emerge
is always complex and politically charged. Information on which decisions are based
is often incomplete or inaccurate, and by the time decisions are implemented, the
problems that they were meant to address may have changed.62 For example, by the
time UNAMIR-II was deployed in July 1994 most of the killing had been ended, and
during the delay hundreds of thousands men, women and children were slaughtered.
   IV.c. Lessons taken from Rwanda Experience :
As David Matas states in his article “Lessons From Rwanda”, “Rwanda
showed that the international system had huge gaps in the mechanisms necessary to
prevent genocide and provide relief”. 1994 Genocide and the turmoil in the refugee
camps have led academics to rethink the whole system of peacekeeping, promotion
of human rights and delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to draw lessons from
the experience of international community for future complex emergencies. This
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chapter asks “how could the international community have improved its response to
the situation in Rwanda?” and “what lessons should be taken from Rwanda
experience?” In attempting answers, it is important not to search for idealistic
solutions, but rather to remain within the constraints of the reality of the UN system
today and identify actions that can improve future response.
All the institutions and organizations like Human Rights Watch, Organization
of African Unity (OAU), Médicines Sans Frontieres, Independent Inquiry, Carnegie
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, US Institute of Peace and academics
who write about Rwanda, add a chapter on “lessons from Rwanda experience” for
the improved functioning of ongoing operations and better conduct of future ones.
After summarizing some of these studies, which put forth specific lessons, this
chapter will search for general lessons for future humanitarian emergencies.
The Lessons Learned Unit of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO) is one of these institutions embarked on a study of UNAMIR to draw
lessons. DPKO prepared the “Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from
United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR)” and concludes that
“from its inception until its eventual withdrawal, UNAMIR seemed always to be one
step behind the realities of the situation in Rwanda”. 63 It says the traditional
peacekeeping role of a United Nations military presence needs to be expanded to a
peace-support and conflict-repair operation. And, it recommends mandates for
peacekeeping operations reflect realities on the ground and be drafted with flexibility
to allow peacekeepers to perform various peace-building tasks.64
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According to the Report, a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the
conflict contributed to false political assumptions and military assessments.65 At the
beginning of the crisis, Security Council members tended to view the situation in
Rwanda as a small civil war. The lack of information analysis was one of the
problems that hindered the planning for UNAMIR. Therefore, the Report says, the
Security Council should consider expanding its resources of information.
After summarizing the difficulties stemming from UN decision to reduce
UNAMIR’s troop strength during the genocide, and reminding of the self-defense
posture of UNAMIR with its limited mandate, means and low ammunition, DPKO
states that one of the painful lessons of Rwanda was: “Go in too light and, in the end,
instead of keeping the peace, the Blue Helmets become vulnerable targets”.66 The
report also acknowledges that troop contingents that arrive late and poorly equipped
contributed to the overall ineffectiveness of the mission.
About Belgium’s withdrawal, DPKO states that “unilateral withdrawal of
national contingents after they have been deployed in an operation should be
discouraged as such actions jeopardize the safety of the remaining force”.67 It adds
that any withdrawal of troops and evacuation of nationals should be done in
coordination and in consultation with the force commander.
Organization of African Unity (OAU) is another organization deeply
involved in the Arusha Peace Process and the following developments in Rwanda.
The organization prepared a report on Rwanda crisis, stating the reasons for failure
from an African perspective and formulated specific recommendations for Rwanda.
OAU concludes in its Report that the lesson to be learned from the “betrayal” at ETO
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and other experiences was the full potential of UNAMIR went unexplored and
unused, as a result, countless more Rwandans died than otherwise might have. 68
 Under the heading of “recommendations to the international community”,
OAU says  “the UN Secretary General should play “a strong and independent role”
in promoting an early resolution to conflict. We call on the Secretary-General to
actively exercise his right under Article 99 of the UN Charter to bring to the attention
of the Security Council any matter that might threaten international peace and
security.”69 OAU also calls for a substantial re-examination of the 1948 Genocide
Convention and some amendments to strengthen mechanisms within the UN for
collecting and analyzing information concerning situations that are at risk for
genocide.70 According to its Report, one possible step is to create a post – a Special
Rapporteur for the Genocide Convention– within the office of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights and responsible for referring pertinent information
to the Secretary General and the Security Council.71
The massive Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, a
comprehensive enquiry initiated by Denmark in 1994 involving 19 countries and a
number of international organizations and NGOs, emphasized the importance of
public information.72 Acknowledging the fact that the government of Rwanda, in the
post-civil-war period, regarded UNAMIR not as a partner but as a rival undermining
its authority, the Report says “an appropriate information and public relations
program should be part of a peacekeeping operation so that the objectives of the UN
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presence are made known continuously to the people, the host government,
neighboring countries and to other interested parties.”73
Vaccaro draws different lessons; he argues “the experience of UNAMIR-I
puts into question the notion that peace operations should be phased in.74 According
to his account “to rely on phased strategies or other strategies that wait for the local
parties to take the first steps towards reconciliation is to risk the chance that the
process will never get off the ground”.75
He examines Belgium’s role by asking “was it wise to include the old
imperial power in the first place?” He claims “a similarly competent UN contingent
with less of a history in the local conflict would probably have provided a more
sustainable core for UNAMIR”.76 But, he adds “the UN force might have been able
to protect more civilians during phase I of the UNAMIR’s mission had the Belgian
contingent not been abruptly withdrawn”.77
Reminding of the role of radio broadcasting in hate propaganda and genocide,
Vaccaro  underlined the importance of UN information campaign and destruction of
the transmitters or jamming of hate radio’s propaganda. He argues,78
 “The UN should overcome its reluctance to intrude on the airwaves of member
states without their permission. Chapter VII operations are legal interventions,
overriding the UN Charter’s strictures against intervention into domestic
jurisdiction of states. The UN should interpret intervention to include
intervention over the airwaves as well as over the ground. Chapter VI
operations are more problematic because they are based on the consent of the
host government(s) and other recognized parties. The UN should make it clear
that an information campaign consistent with the mandate of peacekeeping
operation is part of such an operation. The right to conduct such a campaign
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should be arranged before the Security Council authorizes a Chapter VI
operation.”
As an alternative to peace keeping and peace enforcement, Vaccaro
recommends  states in the region have forces trained and equipped for the sort of
intervention needed in Rwanda.79 He continues by saying, “[if regional states had
done so] it is conceivable that the handful of UN members who pay the majority of
peacekeeping costs would have supported a Security Council decision to send those
forces into action”.80
Some academics consider the failure in Rwanda as a case showing the need
for a middle option between Chapter VI peacekeeping and Chapter VII peace
enforcement operations.81 They write “if left with only traditional peacekeeping and
simple enforcement as options, the international community may likely reject
responding to a crisis –seeing peacekeeping as ineffective and enforcement as too
bloody-minded– when response might have been the best course of all concerned.”82
They offer “coercive inducement” as a “practicable alternative” and define the
concept as “the judicious resort to coercive diplomacy or forceful persuasion by the
international community in order to implement community norms and mandates vis-
à-vis all the parties to a particular crisis.”83
The above mentioned reports, books and articles put forward a number of
lessons on mandate, means, planning, coordination, military and security aspects,
CIVPOL activities, logistics and administration, human resources, public
information, relations with local authorities, peace building, justice and national
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reconciliation, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP). These lessons require
international community have the following conditions in place for the best possible
political decisions to be made and carried out; an effective early warning system,
better overall advice to the Security Council, a more capable and responsive
Secretariat, a rapid reaction force, proper doctrine, capability and rules of
engagement for peacekeepers to permit protection of populations at risk, better
coordination structures and a better informed and educated UN membership. But, as
Trevor Findlay points out, “these lessons, while they might be absorbed
intellectually, are unlikely ever to be fully realized because politics will always shape
peace operations, subverting what might be considered optimal, rational solutions.”84
Furthermore, the scope of these particular lessons is limited; they only answer how
international community could have been successful in Rwanda crisis, a specific
case. What can be realistically done is to reconsider the reasons for failure in Rwanda
and draw general lessons applicable to future humanitarian emergencies.
The implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement was in doubt from the
outset because of clear signals that the parties did not trust each other, Habyarimana
coalition government was deeply divided and because the peace process was not
supported by internal and external actors. As mentioned above, weak political
support for reconciliation was one of the reasons for failure. Therefore, the lesson for
the international community and the UN is to shepherd fragile and complex peace
process through to their conclusion by means of sustained, attentive and
interventionist international support.
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UNAMIR was an inappropriate option for the Rwanda crisis. It was
established as a traditional peacekeeping operation to help implement Arusha Peace
Agreement. But, it was incapable of meeting the requirements of the Agreement.
When the genocide began in April 1994, UNAMIR did what it could do to protect
some tens of thousands of civilians, but could not stop the killings. The lesson for the
international community is that peacekeeping is not a suitable means to undertake
humanitarian interventions in complex emergencies like Rwanda.
Rwanda crisis shows that more intervention was needed when the situation
eventually turned to genocide. As Abiew argues “Deployment of a stronger UN force
early in the crisis could save not only lives but also money.”85 Because the human
and material cost of dealing with the genocide far outweighed the costs of preventive
action, Rwanda is considered a failure to invest in early warning and preventive
diplomacy. But, Thomas G. Weiss challenges this approach by pointing out
intervention dilemma; he says “it is always easier to demonstrate that earlier
investments would have been worthwhile when it is too late rather than when experts
warn of impending disasters. The dilemma is that prevention is cost effective in the
long run but cost intensive in the short run…, thus prevention appears
Pollyannaish”.86 The lesson is that if preventive measures fail it is necessary to
intervene more forcibly. Considering intervention dilemma, it is necessary to expand
the UN’s capacity to prevent and suppress genocide.
Rwanda demonstrates that early warning cannot prevent a crisis in the
absence of political will. The international community was inundated with warnings
about what was going to happen, but political considerations and problems about
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information gathering and analysis caused failure to read the signals and respond
adequately. The signals of the coming genocide were either ignored or not translated
into effective conflict management. Failures of early warning are attributable to
inadequate media coverage and disjuncture within the UN between information
collection, analysis, and the development of strategic options. The lesson for the
international community is to strengthen its mechanisms for information analysis and
refine its existing systems for early warning.
UNAMIR operated without an approved budget for some time, and some of
the logistical problems it faced were a result of the belated process of obtaining
financing for the mission.87 Given that financial crisis in the UN was an important
difficulty hindering a proper response, providing adequate financing is vital for better
management of UN operations.
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CONCLUSION
At present, the thinking on humanitarian intervention is in a state of flux and
the emergence of customary law is subject to the political interests of UN member
states, which appear reluctant to establish precedents.1 As confirmed by the Rwanda
case, the question of whether and how to intervene with military force is always
controversial for any political system, because of the potential costs –both human
and economic– of such a decision. Therefore, we can conclude that, despite the
progress made about humanitarian intervention, decisions on whether and how to
intervene in specific cases will be caught up in politics.
Many past failures can clearly be attributed to lack of political will,
inadequate sources, financial difficulties, insufficient forces deployed with unclear
mandates and to insufficient license to use of force when necessary to achieve the
goals of the mission, as in Rwanda case. Therefore we can reach to some
generalizations about “humanitarian intervention” from the analysis of Rwanda case.
The Rwanda case highlights the fact that having a peace agreement in hand
does not mean that peaceful conditions exist or that risks have been eliminated.2
Political support, from both internal and external actors during the peace process is
vital for a peaceful solution. Inadequate political support during Arusha Peace
Process accelerated the events that led to genocide.
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Rwanda case demonstrates that it is necessary, from the beginning, to be
objective about whether Chapter VI or Chapter VII action is warranted, what form it
should take and the resources required. While consensus can be more readily
generated in support of peacekeeping, if Chapter VII action is required, as in Rwanda
case, peacekeeping cannot be used as a substitute.3 It has been observed of Operation
Turquoise that a mandate and willingness to use force contributed to operation’s
success. Therefore, such interventions should be grounded in Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, allowing the use of force and providing the necessary deterrent means.4
The Rwandan crisis shows that more intervention was needed when the
situation eventually turned to genocide. It brings into question the continued
relevance of the traditional pattern of UN peacekeeping (in the case, the relevance of
UNAMIR) in complex humanitarian emergencies like Rwanda. Today, it is
commonly accepted that peacekeeping has worked only when parties to a conflict
want a settlement or a freeze of the status quo.5 In all other situations, it has been
either ineffective or counterproductive.6 Rwanda case also illustrates the importance
of choosing a mission mandate that is consistent with the situation in that country.
The mandate and rules of engagement of the UNAMIR mission were limited and did
not allow the force to get better results.
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The failure in Rwanda points out to the importance of the question “Would
dead peacekeepers cost you votes in the next election?” in decision making process.7
The mandates of UNAMIR were a product of the international political environment
in which they were formulated, and tended to reflect concerns and imperatives of
certain member states.8 That is to say, politics is one of the most determining factors
in the decision on whether or not to intervene. Richard Haas puts it, “it is most
important to recognize that intervening everywhere is not an option, even for a great
or superpower like the US. There will always be more reasons to intervene than
resources available or than the body politic is prepared to support.”
Can external intervention ever be disinterested and genuinely humanitarian?
“Politics of intervention” also brings up the relation between “interests” and
“intervention”. A comparison between French and American responses to the crisis
clearly displays this relationship. As I mentioned before, at least some semblance of
a “national interest” must be present for a country to commit troops and resources to
an intervention, especially in a “complex emergency” like Rwanda crisis. As Michael
Walzer confirms, “States do not send their soldiers into other states,… only in order
to save lives.”9
Andrew Natsios clearly explains how politics affect the decision making
process, by using the US example.10 He argues “Policymakers will actively support
an early and robust US government response to a complex humanitarian emergency
if it threatens the geopolitical interests of the United Sates.” “But”, he adds “the US
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government response to a complex emergency in an area peripheral to US interests”
would be difficult because such a decision “will usually provoke opposition from
career diplomats and the US military”.
The fact confirmed by the Rwanda crisis that governmental involvement in
humanitarian intervention owes much to realpolitik, is a general conclusion also
valid for future complex emergencies. For example, in order to predict what kind of
reaction the US will show in a particular case requiring intervention, we should look
at politics in the US and examine what prominent political figures say. In her article
“Promoting the National Interest”, Condoleezza Rice, national security adviser of
George W. Bush administration, says “Foreign policy in a Republican administration
will most certainly be internationalist…But it will also proceed from the firm ground
of the national interest, not from the interests of an illusory international
community.”11 Secretary of State Colin Powel puts it stronger: “the US is not world’s
911”.12 In the light of these statements we can conclude that in case of a crisis like
Rwanda, the US would again remain reluctant. Its reluctance would affect other
actors’ attitude towards intervention, and, unless there is a powerful state whose
interests are at stake in that complex emergency, there would probably be no urge to
undertake military humanitarian intervention, but lots of humanitarian aid after the
event. This is all about politics and a matrix of actors’ conflicting interests, their
competition for resources, incompatible organizational structures, and overlapping
functions.
Thomas Weiss and Cindy Collins make the point as follows,
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“Complex humanitarian emergencies require multiple responses from a variety
of actors, none of whom is capable of responding alone….[But,] because the
motivations for a state’s involvement in a humanitarian crisis dramatically vary
across time and among different governments as a result of their political,
economic, social and security issues, the actors in the humanitarian system
cannot rely upon states for consistent support and behavior.” 13
Whereas, politics of intervention was not the only reason for the failure. It
played its part together with “lack of resources” and “limited mandate of the
UNAMIR mission”, and  resulted in failure. Because, there is no solid “humanitarian
intervention” mechanism, capable of taking action when it is necessary, and
independent of US’ or any other powerful state’s willingness to take the lead. The
chaotic international response to the crisis in Rwanda also showed that international
community needs a coherent international strategy for humanitarian intervention.14
In the absence of such a strategy, intervention mechanism and  objective criteria
guiding UN actions, it seems that “humanitarian intervention” will maintain its ad
hoc and precarious nature for some time.
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